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The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A
Jurisdictional Weapon in the War on
Drugs
ABSTRACT

This Note addresses the ongoing use of extralegal apprehension, as
applied under Ker v. Illinois and Frisbie v. Collins, as a viable alternative to extradition in obtaining custody over those accused of exporting
drugs to the United States. The author outlines the cultural and political
reasonsfor the production of illicit drugs, examines the purposes and
structures offormal extradition treaties and their effectiveness in bringing drug traffickers to trial, and considers the alternatives to formal extradition. The author concludes that extralegal apprehension, in both of
its two forms-abduction and irregular rendition-should remain an
alternativemeans of securing custody of a drug trafficker in certain exceptional cases of narcotics enforcement. This Note recognizes the significant risks inherent in such a policy; the author argues, however, that
United States law enforcement agencies should resort to extralegal apprehension only when formal extraditionfails. In such cases, law enforcement agencies should opt primarilyfor irregular rendition of the drug
trafficker by way of ad hoc, clandestine arrangementswith the host state.
Abduction, the author argues, should be used only in cases in which the
host state has provided aid or sanctuary to the wanted drug trafficker.
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INTRODUCTION

On 3 April 1990, four men in civilian clothes, who identified themselves only as "security agents," apprehended Dr. Humberto Alvarez
Machain, a Mexican national wanted in connection with the murder of
United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent Enrique
Camarena-Salazar.' Dr. Alvarez was taken from his medical office in
Guadalajara, Mexico and flown to El Paso, Texas where DEA agents
placed him under arrest and flew him to Los Angeles. 2 Nicknamed "Dr.
Mengele" by DEA agents, referring to the infamous Nazi physician, Dr.
Alvarez is accused of injecting Camarena with the stimulant lidocaine to
prevent Camarena's heart from failing during his 1985 interrogation,
torture, and murder at the hands of Mexican drug traffickers, police, and
military officials.'
The apprehension was allegedly the plot of Antonio Garate Bustamonte, a fifty-one year old former Mexican police officer and current
free-lance operative of the DEA.4 According to Garate, his plans for the
venture were approved by Hector Berellez, a Los Angeles DEA agent
and head of Operation Leyenda, a nine member unit investigating the
murder of Camarena. 5 Law enforcement sources in the United States
confirmed that Los Angeles DEA agents played a key role in arranging
the operation by promising a bounty, in an amount between $50,000 and
$100,000, for the capture of Alvarez.'
Reaction to the method of the Alvarez capture was swift. In an apparent act of reprisal, a major Mexican news magazine, Proceso, published

1. See Branigin, Kidnapping of Doctor Riles Mexico, Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1990, at
A29. Antonio Garate Bustamonte, the alleged mastermind of the operation, stated that

ten Mexicans, including Mexican federal policemen, participated in the apprehension.
See Weinstein, DEA Operative Details His Role in Kidnapping,L.A. Times, Apr. 28,
1990, at Al, col. 1,
2. Branigin, supra note 1. Dr. Alvarez alleges that one of his abductors identified
himself as a DEA agent. Miller, Mexico to Confront U.S. on Camarena Case Abduction, L.A. Times, Apr. 18, 1990, at Al, col. 5. United States Attorney General Dick
Thornburgh, however, stated that the DEA had established that none of its agents were
present when Alvarez was taken from his medical office. Lauter, Mexico Leader Scolds
Quayle over Abduction, L.A. Times, Apr. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 3. Garate confirms that
no DEA agent set foot in Mexico to assist in the kidnapping. Weinstein, supra note 1.
3. Shannon, Snatching "Dr. Mengele", TIME, Apr. 23, 1990, at 27.
4. Weinstein, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Miller, supra note 2. United States Vice President Dan Quayle, while visiting
Mexico after the incident, asserted that "no DEA agents in Mexico were involved in this
particular situation," thus carefully side-stepping the issue of whether DEA agents based
in the United States participated in the capture. Lauter, supra note 2.
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the names of forty-nine United States DEA agents currently operating in
Mexico.7
With relations between the United States and Mexico already strained
over the past five years because of Mexico's failure to turn over highranking former officials wanted for Camarena's murder,8 Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari expressed his extreme displeasure regarding the incident to United States Vice President Dan Quayle and
demanded "new rules" to control joint United States-Mexican anti-drug
efforts. 9
Further, Mexican Attorney General Enrique Alvarez del Castillo announced the arrests of six Mexican nationals, including two senior officers of the Guanajunato state police, for their role in "illegally depriving Dr. Alvarez of his liberty,"" ° and called for the extradition of

Antonio Garate Bustamonte and other United States citizens and Mexican citizens residing in the United States for trial in Mexico." Castillo

7. Shenon, U.S. Agents in Mexico, Listed, Are on Alert, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1990,
at A5, col 1. The DEA, in a prepared statement, denounced Proceso, calling its publication "an irresponsible act that could potentially threaten the safety of our dedicated
agents." Id. When asked for an explanation for printing the list, Carlos Puig, a Washington correspondent of Proceso, answered, "We- don't need the explanation .... The
list is news." Id.
8. On the ongoing reluctance of the Mexican Government to extradite its citizens to
the United States for drug prosecution despite the existence of a 1978 United StatesMexico extradition treaty, see Isikoff, Mexican Doctor's Arrest Triggers "Kidnap"
Charges, Wash. Post. Apr. 17, 1990, at A14; Murphy, Extradition From Mexico: It's
Tricky Going, L.A. Times, Apr. 20, 1989, § 1, at 3, col. 1; Rohter, Mexico Arrests 6 in
Abduction Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1990, § 1, at A9, col. 3
9. Lauter, supra note 2. President Salinas also told Vice President Quayle that he
was under heavy domestic political pressure regarding cooperation with the United States
in drug control. Id. Responding to Salinas' displeasure, Garate claimed that Mexican
officials brought the kidnapping on themselves by failing to punish all who participated
in Camarena's murder. See Weinstein, supra note 1.
10. Rohter, supra note 8. The New York Times notes the
speed and thoroughness with which the Mexican Government has moved to identify and apprehend Dr. Alvarez's kidnappers comes in sharp contrast to its handling of the original investigation into the murder of Mr. Camarena. It was only
after months of prodding by American officials... that Mr. Camarena's murderers, torturers and kidnappers, including several policemen working in the state of
Jalisco, were arrested.
Id.
11. See Branigin, Mexico to Seek Extradition of Alleged Kidnap Leader, Wash.
Post, Apr. 29, 1990, at A21; Miller, Mexico to Seek Warrants in Suspect's Kidnaping,
L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 1990, at A7, col. 1. The bulletin from the Mexican Foreign Ministry stated, "The Mexican government will immediately initiate proceedings to request
the extradition of people, be they nationals or foreigners, who have participated in the
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said, "[n]othing and nobody can justify the illicit manner in which [Alvarez] was not only detained, but kidnapped and transported to a foreign
country."' 2
Historically, conduct such as the abduction of Dr. Alvarez has been
justified, both in the United States and abroad. The purpose of this Note
is to examine the issue of this type of "extralegal apprehension" in light
of the problems and circumstances unique to the fight to eradicate drug
trafficking. In this connection, emphasis is placed on the legal foundations of this activity and the risks a state assumes by following this
course of action.
The practices of abduction and irregular rendition 3 are not new to
the United States or to the international community at large. Part II of
this Note details recent occurrences of these extralegal activities and then
outlines the nature of the international drug problem, including its cultural foundations and impact on the governments of drug producing
states. Part III discusses the structure of formal extradition and notes its
shortcomings in apprehending drug traffickers. Part IV addresses the alternatives to formal extradition-abduction and irregular rendition-focusing on United States case law and legislative developments.
Part V concludes that the practices of abduction and irregular rendition
are viable alternatives to extradition when extradition fails.
II.
A.

A

FOREBODING BACKDROP

The Camarena Murder

On 7 February 1985, Enrique Camarena-Salazar, an undercover agent
of the DEA, and his pilot were kidnapped in front of the United States
Consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico 1 4 and driven to the home of a Mexican drug smuggler. There, both men were interrogated, tortured, and
killed.' 5 Their bodies were found one month later." On 24 January

execution, planning or organization of the kidnaping." Id. Mexican Attorney General
Castillo, however, did not place blame on the DEA for the kidnapping and it is not
certain whether Mexico would request the extradition of any DEA agents. Id.
12. Rohter, supra note 8.
13. For the purpose of discussing these two different methods of extralegal apprehension, this Note utilizes the terms put forth in Abramovsky & Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders Abroad: Extradition, Abduction, or Irregular Rendition?, 57 OR. L. REV. 51 (1977).
14. L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, § 1, at 2, col. 6.
15. Although drug traffickers devised the plot against Camarena, Mexican police officers actually murdered him. See J. INCIARDI, THE WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, CoCAINE, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY 188 (1986); See infra note 50.
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1986, six Mexican police officers 17 apprehended Rene Martin VerdugoUrquidez while he was driving his car in San Felipe, Mexico. The
Mexican police blindfolded, handcuffed, and placed Verdugo face down
in the back seat of the unmarked police car, and drove him to the Mexican-United States border at Calexico, California. 8 After the Mexican
police pushed Verdugo into the waiting arms of United States marshals,
the marshals placed him under arrest for narcotics trafficking and murder.1 9 Verdugo is one of the nineteen individuals charged with the abduction and murder of Camarena and his pilot.20
On 5 April 1988, one hundred special Honduran police officers arrested Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, another major drug trafficker,
outside his mansion in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and flew him to the Dominican Republic." After Dominican officials placed Matta on a New
York-bound jet, United States marshals arrested him on board the
plane.2 2 As they did with Verdugo, federal officials charged Matta with

In 1986, Mexican police abducted and tortured another DEA agent, Victor Cortez, Jr.
Cortez was beaten and shocked with electric cattle prods for six hours. L.A. Times, Aug.
19, 1986, § 1, at 5, col. I.
16. L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, § 1, at 2, col. 6.
17. There is some question whether the six individuals were in fact police officers.
Mexican officials claim that only four of the men were State Judicial Police officers and
that the other two were civilians. Mexican police authorities state that the four officers
were dismissed on 15 January 1986, nine days before Verdugo's apprehension. Reza,
$32,000 Was Paid to Mexicans Who Seized Key Drug Figure, L.A. Times, Mar. 13,
1986, § 2, at 2, col. 1. At the time of Verdugo's apprehension, however, at least one of
the six men showed Verdugo a badge. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d
1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 1175.
18. Verdugo, 856 F.2d at 1216.
19. Id.; see Murphy, Mexico Hits Arrest in Killing of U.S. Drug Agent, L.A. Times,
June 22, 1988, § 2, at 3, col. 1.
20. Branigin, supra note 1.
21. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1; see United States v. Matta-Ballesteros,
700 F. Supp. 528, 529 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Matta-Ballesteros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman,
697 F. Supp. 1036, 1041-42 (S.D. Ill. 1988). Matta previously avoided detention in
Colombia in March 1985 by bribing his way out of a Bogota prison. Mathews, Bolivia's
Coca Output Restored, Officials Say, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1987, at A14, col. 4. He purportedly paid the prison guards approximately $2 million. See Riding, Cocaine Billionaire: The Men Who Hold Colombia Hostage, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 27, 32.
Matta was not the first individual apprehended extralegally by Honduran authorities.
See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984) (jurisdiction upheld
over defendant Yamanis who was apprehended by a United States agent with the assistance of Honduran officials).
22. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
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narcotics trafficking and the,murder of DEA agent Camarena. 3 Matta
now awaits trial for the murder of Camerena in a maximum security
federal prison in Marion, Illinois."'
B.

The Invasion of Panama

On 20 December 1989, approximately 24,000 United States troops 25
took control of the Republic Of Panama, "decapitating" 2 the regime of
General Manuel Noriega and installing the elected government of President Guillermo Endara.17 Officials of the Administration of United
States President George Bush claimed that the invasion was a measure
of "self-defense" 2 8 and stated four objectives for the military operation:
(1) to protect the lives of United States citizens in Panama; (2) to assure
the security of the Panama Canal and the integrity of the Canal

23. Graham, Impact of Colombian Traffickers Spreads, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1988,
at Al, A22.
24. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 6. A third man, Manuel Ibarra Herrera, a
commander of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, was also arrested in connection with
the Camarena murder. See Molotsky, Physicianfrom Mexico Arrested in '85 Slaying of
U.S. Drug Agent, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1990, at A2, col. 3.
25. The United States had approximately 12,000 troops already stationed in Panama, and the invasion force exceeded 10,000. Rosenthal, U.S. Forces Gain Wide Control
in Panama;New Leaders in but Noriega Gets Away, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al,
col. 6, A8, col. 1. This was the largest United States military operation since the Vietnam
War. Id. at Al, col. 6.
26. See id. at A8, col. I (statement of General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff).
27. Id. President Endara and, Vice Presidents Ricardo Arias Calder6n and Guillermo Ford were sworn in at a United States military base just before the attack began.

Id,
28. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at A9, col. 3 (statement of Secretary of State,
James A. Baker, III). Secretary Baker invoked the inherent right of self-defense, as recognized in article 51 of the United NationsCharter and article 21 of the Charter of the
Organization of American States (O.A.S.), and the duty of the United States to protect
the Panama Canal under article 4 of the Panama Canal Treaty. Id.
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reads in part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations ....

U.N.

CHARTER

art. 51.

Article 21 of the O.A.S. Charter provides:
The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have
recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with
existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.
Charter of the Organization of American States, signed Apr. 30, 1948, art. 21, 2 U.S.T.
2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Treaty;2 9 (3) to restore democracy to Panama; and (4) to capture General Manuel Noriega for trial in the United States.3 0 The invasion occurred five days after the Panamanian legislature declared a "state of
war" with the United States and appointed General Noriega as chief
executive officer.3 1
On 3 January 1990, after seeking refuge for eleven days in the Vatican Embassy of Panama, General Norieg, surrendered to United States
authorities. 2 On the following day, Noriega was arraigned on drug trafficking charges at the federal courthouse in Miami, Florida, and entered
a plea of not guilty.3 3 If convicted, Noriega could receive a maximum
penalty of 145 years in prison and approximately $1.1 million in fines.34
Verdugo, Matta, Alvarez, and Noriega were not the subject of formal
United States extradition proceedings. 5 Rather, all four face criminal

29. Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, done Oct. 1, 1979, 33 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 10029, - U.N.T.S. -.
30. Johnston, U.S. Aide Hints at a Deal If the General Tells All, N.Y. Times, Jan.
5, 1990, at A8, col. 1
31. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at A7, col. I.
32. Barke, Noriega Arraigned in Miami in a Drug-Trafficking Case; He Refuses to
Enter a Plea, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at Al, coL,.6.
33. Id.
34. Id. The Miami indictment charges Noriega with receiving over $4.6 million from
Medellin drug traffickers to protect cocaine shipments from Colombia, through Panama,
to the United States; Id. See infra note 69.
Specifically, Noriega is charged with violating 18 IU.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988), by "exploit[ing] his positions to obtain substantial personal profit by offering narcotics traffickers the safe use of the Republic of Panama as a location for transshipment of multihundred kilogram loads of cocaine destined for the -United States." Indictment at 1-2,
United States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079CR (S.D. Fla. 1990), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS I
[hereinafter Noriega Indictment].
In addition, Noriega allegedly
agreed to permit the [Medellin] Cartel to establisli and supply a cocaine laboratory
in Darien Province, Panama.
In the Spring of 1984, members of the Cartel-and other cocaine traffickers fled
Colombia as a result of increased law enforcement activities in that country.
[Noriega] agreed to permit members of the Cartel and others to continue their
narcotics business within the borders of Panama and to notify them if and when
any law enforcement action was to be taken against them.
Id. at 8.
35. In the case of Matta, however, no extradition proceedings took place because
Honduras has no extradition treaty with the Unite&States; the Honduran Constitution
forbids extradition of its nationals. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
Regarding Verdugo, although the United States has an extradition treaty with Mexico, DEA officials relied on representations of Mexican law enforcement officers that
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prosecution in the United States by virtue of extralegal apprehension
from a foreign state. 6
C.

The Drug Problem

The problem of drug trafficking and drug use is apparent to people of
the United States. The drug problem permeates the societies of most
states around the world, making enforcement of drug laws a multi-billion dollar task. 7 After examining the history of drug control efforts, the
United States Congress concluded that "there are no easy answers to the
international problem of narcotics production, trafficking, and abuse. "38
In fact, Congress found that
U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to increase their antinarcotics efforts are ultimately limited by the difficulty of dealing with sovereign
Verdugo could be arrested by Mexican police if there were an outstanding United States
warrant for his arrest. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1216 (9th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 1175. Such a warrant was issued after Verdugo was
indicted on 3 August 1985 for marijuana smuggling. See L.A. Times, Mar. 13, 1986, §
2, at 2, col. 1.Almost two and a half years after his apprehension, the Mexican Government issued a formal protest against the arrest of Verdugo, claiming that the apprehension and arrest violated Mexican, and international law. See Murphy, supra note 19.
Further, a Mexican prosecutor filed formal kidnapping charges against the six Mexican
police officers. Verdugo, 856 F.2d at 1216 n.1. These police officers, who were paid
$32,000 by the United States Government for. Verdugo's apprehension, were allowed to
emigrate to the United States after threats were made on their lives and the lives of their
families. See Murphy, supra note 19; see also Verdugo, 856 F.2d at 1216 n.1.
36. See generally Verdugo, 856 F.2d 1214; United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 700
F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Matta-Ballesteros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F.
Supp. 1036 (S.D. 111. 1988); Noriega Indictment, supra note 34.
On 26 September 1988, after an eight week trial, Verdugo was convicted for his part
in the torture and murder of Enrique Camarena. Murphy, Mexican DrugFigure Found
Guilty in Death of U.S. Agent, L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 6. In October,
1988, Verdugo received a sentence of 240 years, with eligibility for parole after the first
sixty years. L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. 1; see infra note 310.
On 4 May 1989, Juan Matta was arraigned on drug charges. Murder charges have
not yet been brought against Matta even though he is a key suspect in the Camarena
murder. Murphy, Reported Drug Ring Kingpin Arraigned, L.A. Times, May 5, 1989,
§ 1, at 3, col. 6. Matta was convicted of cocaine smuggling on 6 September 1989. Chicago Trib., Sept. 7, 1989, at 13. He was later sentenced to life without parole. Weinstein, Matta Gets Life Term for Running DrugSyndicate, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1990, §
1, at 3, col. 4.
37. In 1988, the United States Congress estimated that the value of illegal drug trade
worldwide was approximately $500 billion and that the United States illegal drug trade
produced between $50 and $100 billion annually at the retail level. See Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 4102(a)(2), (6), 102 Stat. 4818, 4265.
38. H.R. REP. No. 798, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986).
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countries, the boundaries of U.S. leverage, the competition of other U.S.
national security interests, and by the lack of a persuasive U.S. domestic
commitment and effort. Experience has demonstrated that politically attractive solutions such as "cutting off foreign aid" or vastly increased
funding for international narcotics activities will contribute only marginally to combatting this problem."9

The problems of controlling narcotics production and importation begin with the cultures of the people from the drug producing states, where
the cultivation of cannabis, poppy, and coca has been a way of life for
generations. The practice of chewing the coca leaf, for example, goes
back over three thousand years to the religion of the Incas.' 0 Today, the
Indian peasants in the Andes Mountains of South America still chew
coca for the stimulating effects that enable them to work twelve to fourteen hour days in the region's mineral mines and fields."' Both the Bolivian and Peruvian Governments allow controlled production of coca for
2
domestic consumption.4
On the other side of the world, the production of opium and heroin"3
involves millions of peasant farmers in the two principal production
areas of these 'drugs, known as the Golden Triangle and the Golden
Crescent.44 The Golden Triangle, a rugged area in Southeast Asia encompassing Burma, Laos, and Thailand, produced an estimated 734
metric tons of opium in 1986, 560 metric tons in 1985, and 575 metric
tons in 1984.' The Golden Crescent, encompassing Pakistan, Iran, and
Afghanistan, produced approximately 850 metric tons of opium each
year from 1984 to 1986.46 In both regions, peasant hill-farmers make
their living by harvesting raw opium and selling it to local refineries
which change the substance into a morphine base.'7 Refineries then sell

39. Id. at 2-3.
40. See J. INCIARDI, supra note 15, at 1; Note, E'xtradition Treaty Improvements to
Combat Drug Trafficking, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 285, 296 n.87 (1985).
41. See J. INCIARDI, supra note 15, at 6-9; Note, supra note 40, at 296 n.87.
42. J. INCIARDI, supra note 15, at 177-78. Inciardi reports that Bolivia allows production of approximately 12,000 kilograms per year and Peru allows production of approximately 14,000 kilograms per year. Id.
43. The word heroin was first coined by Bayer and Company at the turn of the
twentieth century as a trade name for the morphine-based compound, diacetylmorphine.
Named from the German heroisch, meaning heroic and powerful, Bayer's heroin was
sold as a remedy for morphine addiction and coughs. See id. at 9.

44. Id. at 52.
45. Id. at 53 (citing a report by the United States Department of State).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 55.
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this base to a laboratory where it is transformed into pure heroin.4
The cultural permissiveness of this activity lead one commentator to
write:
Viewed from the perspective of a foreign country such as Pakistan...
United States antidrug policies are simply arrogant. In many places, local
peasant families have grown marijuana, coca, or opium for hundreds of
years. Suddenly they are ordered not to grow what they have always
grown. Americans would never accede to such a request. Suppose some
foreign government asked us to suppress tobacco farmers (perhaps burn
their fields) to improve public health?' 9
The media in a number of drug-producing states echo these sentiments against United States drug policies. Professor James Inciardi5 ° reports that a Bolivian media representative stated, "[D]rug abuse is a
North American problem, a U.S. vice that Bolivia has no responsibility
for. Therefore, Bolivia has no responsibility for drug control. There is no
drug problem here. It is in the United States. Why, then, does your
DEA come down here?" 5 1 Similarly, a Colombian newspaper attacked
the United States drug policy by asking, "Why is the Drug Enforcement
Administration aiming its guns outside the United States, after production? Why not go inside the United States, after consumption?" 5 2
48. Note, InternationalNarcotics Control: A Proposal to Eradicate an International Menace, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 530, 534 n.39 (1984). The author further notes
that the farmer "is paid between $350.00 and $1,000.00 for 10 kilograms of raw opium
[which yields] one kilogram of heroin, which is sold to users for $2.23 million." Id.
49. Thurow, U.S. Drug Policy: Colossal Ignorance, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1988, at
D20, col. 1.
The analogy drawn between tobacco farmers and poppy, coca, and marijuana growers
is appropriate. Experts note that opium crops often support entire local communities. See
Fisher, Trends in ExtraterritorialNarcotics Control: Slamming the Stable Door After
the Horse Has Bolted, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 353, 354 (1984). The Governments
of Thailand, Jamaica, Peru, and Colombia are reluctant to destroy such crops "because
so many farmers depend upon these crops for their livelihood." It was estimated that
marijuana field workers earn approximately $7.50 per hour as compared to $3.50 per
hour in conventional farm work. Note, supra note 40, at 296. Because profit margins are
so inflated, farmers substitute marijuana and coca crops in place of necessary foodstuffs.
These practices only compound the problems of underdeveloped states whose populations
are already starving. See Note, supra note 48, at 533.
50. Inciardi is a Professor and the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice at the
University of Delaware.
51. J. INCIARDI, supra note 15, at 175-76.
52. Id. at 176. Colombian Foreign Minister Julio Londono voiced similar sentiments, claiming that the insatiable drug consumption in the United States has grown
unchecked and poses the single greatest threat to democracy in Latin America. Londono

asserted that the attempt "to eradicate supply alone while the demand grows defies the
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A partial answer to this question is that United States law enforcement does attack the demand side of the drug economy. With his declaration of "War on Drugs" at the beginning of his first term, United
States President Ronald Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan began a
campaign of legislation and political rhetoric5" designed to discourage domestic drug sales and to elevate public awareness of drug use." Domestic, demand side law enforcement, however, is only half the solution. If
the United States is fighting a war against illicit drugs, the United
States, with several thousand miles of land border and coastline and
many internal ports of entry, is an almost indefensible territory against
the invading enemy. The other half of the war, therefore, must be offensive, supply side law enforcement.
Attacking the drug supplier presents a second problem. Because the
cultivation and manufacture of illicit drugs is often firmly rooted in the
culture of a foreign state,55 the drug supplier exploits the culture. In
South America, "narco-trafficantes" are considered local heroes.5 6 For
example, two days after the arrest of Juan Matta, a crowd of 1,500
protestors firebombed the United States Consulate in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.5" Shouting, "Matta yes! Gringos no!," the protestors voiced their
anger toward Honduran President Jose Azcona Hoyo and chanted, "Azcona, if Matta doesn't come back, we want your head."5 " Five people
died in the protest, and Azcona declared a state of emergency in two
major cities. 59

laws of economic gravity." Reichertz, Colombia Criticizes Insatiable Drug Consumption
of Americans, Reuters, June 8, 1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS Library, REUTER File).
Londono expressed the hope that "the government of the United States will achieve victories against drug consumption in the streets of the cities of the United States." Id.
53. The success of President Reagan's War on Drugs is debated. The anti-drug legislation enacted during the Reagan Administration lead one commentator to conclude
that the first victim of the War on Drugs has been the Bill of Rights. See Wistosky,
Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L. J.
889.
54. This is not to say that the public was previously wholly unaware of the domestic
drug problem. By 1982, approximately three thousand parents groups combined themselves into the National Federation of Parents for Drug Free Youth. See id. at 891.
55. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
56. See generally J. INCIARDI, supra note 15, at 177-85.
57. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
58. Id.
59. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 6. This is not an isolated incident. In
November 1982, after a team of Bolivian narcotics agents confiscated sixty kilos of coca
paste in the Chapare growing region, approximately two hundred peasants tortured and
killed the agents that same evening. See J. INCIARDI, supra note 15, at 187.

396

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 23:385

The drug lords also protect their livelihood with effective, brutal, terrorist techniques. In the last six years, Colombian cocaine traffickers
have dealt with their state's extradition policy in a lethal fashion. In
1984, motorcycle-riding gunmen paid by drug traffickers killed Colombian Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara.60 On 12 November, 1985, members
of a narco-terrorist group, known as the April 19 Movement or M-19,
opened fire and seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota, Columbia. Colombian government officials stated that the objective of the guerrillas
was to destroy the records of United States extradition requests against
drug traffickers.61 When the Colombian Army counterattacked, eleven of
the state's twenty-four Supreme Court Justices were killed. 2 These Justices had rejected every legal motion attacking a 1979 Colombian-United
States extradition treaty." On 31 July 1986, another motorcyle-riding
assassin executed Hernando Baquero Borda, a Colombian Supreme
Court Justice who had served on a panel that reviewed extradition requests.6 ' On 13 January 1987, Justice Minister Enrique Parejo Gonzalez was shot by a group calling itself the Hernan Botero Moreno Command-named after one of twelve Colombians extradited to the United
States with Parejo's help. 5 Parejo survived. 6 Also in January 1987, two
Chief Justices resigned from the Court amid death threats from drug
traffickers.6
Despite such pressure by narco-terrorists, Colombia successfully extradited to the United States for trial one of the three top cocaine traf60. Graham, Colombian Supreme Court Overturns Extradition Pact with U.S.,
Wash. Post, June 27, 1987, at A16, col. 1.
61. Graham, 27 Hours That Shook Bogota, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
United States officials later confirmed that all United States extradition requests were
destroyed. See Riding, supra note 21, at 32.
62. Riding, supra note 21, at 32.
63. Graham, supra note 60; see also Treaty on Extradition, done Sept. 14, 1979,
United States-Colombia, -

U.S.T. -,

T.I.A.S. No. -

(entered into force March 4,

1982) [hereinafter Colombia Extradition Treaty], reprinted in 1 I. KAVASS & A.
SPRUDZS, EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES: UNITED STATES 140.1 (1980 & 1989
Supp.). Article 8 of this treaty provides, "Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to
deliver up its own nationals, but the Executive Authority of the Requested State shall
have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion it be deemed proper to do so." Id.
art. 8.
64. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1986, at A3, col. 2.
65. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1987, at D2, col. 2; see also Riding, supra note 21, at 28.
66. Riding, supra note 21, at 28.
67. Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1987, at A25, col. 5. The First Chief Justice, Fernando
Uribe Restrepo, resigned and moved to Ecuador. His successor, Nemesio Camacho Rodriguez, stated upon taking the position, "We're all intimidated, but I don't feel fear." He
resigned five days later. See Riding, supra note 21, at 32.
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fickers in the world." On 4 February 1987, Colombian police arrested
Carlos Lehder Rivas, a leader of the notorious Medellin cartel,6 9 and
formally extradited him to the United States70 under the 1979 treaty
with Colombia.7 1 In reprisal to Lehder's extradition, drug traffickers implemented a rash of killings of judges, journalists, and government
72
officials.
Finally, on 26 June 1987, the Colombia Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Presidential law ratifying the Colombian-United States
extradition treaty.73 The Supreme Court, reestablished after the 1985
attack on the Palace of Justice, found itself in a 12-12 deadlock on the
issue one month prior to this decision.74 To break the tie, the Court
sought a twenty-fifth judge.7 5 Three persons refused the appointment
and the fourth person attempted to beg his way out of the position before
he finally accepted. 76 On 26 June 1987, the last judge voted to strike
down the law.77 Thus, through a campaign of murder and fear, the Colombian drug traffickers intimidated their state's highest court7" and left
68. Thornton, Reported Top Cocaine Trafficker Arrested in Colombia, Faces U.S.
Trial, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 1987, at A18, col. 3.
69. The Medellin cartel is named after the Colombian city of Medellin, the center of
cocaine trafficking in South America.
70. See Thornton, supra note 68. Rivas gained notoriety in 1985 by placing a
$350,000 bounty on the chief of the DEA. Id.
71. See supra note 63.
72. Graham, Drug Killings Cow Colombians,Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1987, at A14, col.
4. Between 1982 and 1987, fifty-seven judges, thirty-six from lower courts, were killed at
the hands of the drug traffickers. See Riding, supra note 21, at 32.
73. Graham, supra note 60. The Columbia Supreme Court previously held the extradition treaty unconstitutional on a technicality: the treaty had been improperly signed
into law by a government minister instead of then-President Belisario Betancur. See id.;
Riding, supra note 21, at 28, 36. After that ruling, the current President, Virgilio Barco,
signed the treaty back into law. Three days later, Guillermo Cano, publisher of Bogota's
second largest paper, was murdered. See Riding, supra note 21, at 28-29; Graham,
supra note 60. It is Barco's action that the Supreme Court overturned.
74. Graham, supra note 60.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. One month before the Colombia Supreme Court decision, Ms. Ann Wrobleski,
Assistant United States Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, asserted
before the United States House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control that
"[iut is not a mere coincidence that in Colombia, the country where the government has
done the most of any nation in South America to control narcotics trafficking, that men
and women risk their lives just by attempting to do their jobs." Colombian Drug Traf-

ficking and Control: HearingBefore the House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and
Control, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987). Labelling the problem "a question of our na-
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79
the state's political and legal system in pieces.

The atmosphere of lawlessness became especially acute on 18 August
1989, when the Medellin Cartel assassinated Luis Carlos Gal5-n, a Colombian Senator and leading Presidential candidate.8 0 After the attack,
President Virgilio Barco, pursuant to the Colombian Constitution, de-

clared a "state of siege" in Colombia on 18 August 1989.81 This declaration empowered President Barco to extradite drug traffickers by executive decree on the recomnmendation of a special narcotics council
consisting of five cabinet ministers."2 The Colombian Supreme Court upheld President Barco's decree on 3 October 1989.3 The Colombian Government is currently struggling to restore order to the state. 4
Colombia does not appear to be an isolated case. Although no other
foreign government appears victimized to the extent of the Colombian
government, bribery, terrorism, and corruption at the hands of drug traffickers also influence the governments of Mexico, the Bahamas, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and Bolivia.8"

tional security," Chairman Charles Rangel further noted that "Colombia is being held
hostage by drug traffickers, because of their inability to enforce the law." Id. at 4.
79. See Riding, Intimidated Colombian Courts Yield to Drug Barons, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 11, 1988, at A3, col. 3. One Colombian official claimed, "It's not an exaggeration to
say that the legal system as we once knew it has broken down .... Even where there are
honest judges, they are too scared to act." Id.
In what may be the ultimate irony, the Medellin Cartel has purportedly hired, among
a host of top lawyers, two former Colombia Supreme Court Justices to "provide terrorized or corrupt judges with legal justifications for their decisions." Id.
80. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1989, at A3, col. I. Colombian police stated that the Medellin Cartel offered $500,000 for the death of Mr. Galin, who escaped a prior assassination attempt on 5 August 1989 in Medellin. Id.
81. Decree No. 1860 of Colombian President Virgilio Barco (Aug. 18, 1989).
82. Id. art. 5. The council is called the Consejo Nacional de Estupelacientes, or
National Council of Narcotics.
83. Sentencia No. 68, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala Plena (Oct. 3, 1989).
84. The Colombian Government has had recent success against the Medellin Cartel.
On 15 December 1989, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, one of the leaders of the Cartel
and mastermind of the Galin assassination, was killed in a shootout with Colombian
security forces. Treaster, A Top Medellin Drug Trafficker Dies in a Shootout in Colombia, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 1. The gunfight was the result of a trap laid
by Colombian police, in which Gacha's son was abruptly released from jail and tailed to
the drug lord. Id. at A10, col. 1.
85. See generally infra note 122 and accompanying text. At the trial of Carlos
Lehder Rivas, a leader of the Medellin Cartel, a government witness stated that Rivas
paid between $3 and $5 million to Bahamian Prime Minister Lynden Pindling between
1978 and 1981 for protection of drug smuggling boats. Graham, Impact of Drug Traffickers Spreads, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1988, at A22, col. 2.
Also, Ramon Milian Rodriguez, former chief financier for the Medellin cartel, told a
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III.

FORMAL EXTRADITION

Unlike extralegal apprehension,"' which operates outside any formal
processes, extradition is a formal legal process between states. The roots
of international extradition run back as far as ancient Egypt. 7 Although
renditions of individuals were usually the result of some form of agreement between states, the practice also grew from reciprocity and comity.88 Extradition was as much a gesture of mutual regard and friendship
between states as it was a legal process.8 9
As the practice of extradition evolved into a more formal system of
bilateral and multilateral treaties between foreign states, legal scholars
began to debate whether there exists a legal duty to extradite or merely a
moral obligation to do so. In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius
maintained that the holding state has the inherent legal duty to deliver
the accused into the hands of the requesting state or to punish the accused under its own law.9 0 The rule of conduct became expressed as
"aut dedere aut punire,"' which translates, "either surrender or punish." Conversely, commentators maintain that extradition is merely an
imperfect obligation that gains validity under international law only
when embodied in a particular treaty between states. 2 A sovereign state
presumably has control over its constituents, and separate states are
sanctuaries to which individuals may run, seeking safe haven from another state.9" Without some specialized compact between the states,

Senate investigatory committee that the Cartel paid General Manuel Noriega approximately $320 million between 1979 and 1983 for the use of Panamanian airports and
banks and for information regarding identities of United States drug agents and military
surveillance vessels. Id.
86. See infra part IV, section A.
87. I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971). The oldest document in diplomatic history pertaining to extradition is a treaty between Rameses II of
Egypt and Hattusili III of the Hittites, which dates from 1280 B.C. Id.
88. 1 M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 5 (1987).

89. Id.; see I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at 6 n.3. The treaty between Rameses II and
Hattusili III was, in effect, a peace treaty to end the Syrian war. The treaty provided for
eternal peace, alliance against common enemies, trade protection, and emigration, as well
as extradition of criminals. Id.
90. H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PAciS, bk. II, ch. 21, paras. 3-4 (1624), cited
in I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at 24 and in 1 M. BASSIOuNI, supra note 88, at 10.
91. 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 10.
92. S. PUFFENDORF, THE ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE, bk. VIII, ch.
3, §§ 23-24, cited in I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at 24 and in 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 88, at 10.
93. See S. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 29-30
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which by nature must outline specific situations or offenses that warrant
extradition, the holding state need not deliver the individual to the requested state. 4
In 1840, with the United States Supreme Court decision in Holmes v.
Jennison,"5 United States jurisprudence sided with the imperfect obligation theory of extradition, holding that, absent a specific treaty requirement, the United States has no obligation to extradite under international law. This view still exists today."
As a natural consequence of embracing the "imperfect obligation" theory of extradition, the United States system of extradition adopted certain procedural hoops, which international law had already established,
through which the requesting state must jump. One commentator listed
these requirements: (1) the crime that the accused has allegedly committed must be a recognized crime by both states; (2) a requisite amount of
evidence must be supplied to show that the accused actually committed
the offense; (3) an accused may not be tried for the same act twice; (4)
extradition of nationals is at the option of the host state; (5) extradition
for a political offense is at the option of the host state. 7 Unfortunately,
this procedural recipe renders traditional extradition inadequate for narcotics enforcement. 8
Beginning with the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909,"9 the international community has recognized drug-trafficking as a problem. Since
that meeting, the United States has participated in several major conventions relating to the prevention and criminalization of drug production
and to the transportation and extradition of offenders.10 0 Though noble

(1968) (quoting Puffendorf and Lord Coke).
94. "[Tjhe liability to war which a state incurs when it receives and protects fugitive
criminals arises rather from special compact than from any general obligation." Id. at
29 (quoting Puffendoro; see also I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at 24.
95. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
96. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211
F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954).
97. See Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseasfor Trial in the United States: Is-

sues of Internationaland Domestic Law, 23 TEx.

INT'L

L.J. 1, 6 (1988).

98. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 8 (describing the reluctance of the Mexican Government to extradite its citizens to the United States for drug prosecution despite the
existence of a 1978 United States-Mexico extradition treaty).
99. Thirteen states met in Shanghai on 1 February 1908 to discuss the growing international problem of opium trafficking and use. See Wright, The InternationalOpium
Commission (pt. 1), 3 A.J.I.L. 648 (1909).
100. International Opium Convention, done Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. No.
612, 8 L.N.T.S. 187; Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, done July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. No. 863, 139

KER-FRISBIE DOCTRINE

1990]

in design, commentators criticize these agreements for including denunciation and escape clauses and for lacking any concrete enforcement

mechanisms1

l

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, for example, was adopted

by over 140 states-including the United States-to simplify and codify
a comprehensive agreement with respect to narcotics control1 °a Of the
fifty-one articles of the Convention, however, only articles 35 and 36
address the problem of illicit drugs. Article 36, while delineating specific
punishable offenses, also contains an escape clause, which provides that

any party "shall have the right to refuse to effect the [arrest or] grant the
extradition in cases where the competent authorities consider that the
offence is not sufficiently serious."1 0 Article 36 also permits the signatory parties to define, prosecute, and punish offenses in accordance with
their own law.10 4 The denunciation clause, article 46, allows any party

to denounce any or all of the current treaties.1

5

Similar problems confront the United States in its bilateral extradition

efforts. Because the United States recognizes the power to extradite pursuant only to a treaty, courts tend to treat such agreements less as man-

dates of international law and more as self-contained contracts between
L.N.T.S. 301; Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done Mar. 30 1961, 18 U.S.T.
1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204; Convention on Psychotropic Substances,
done Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, T.I.A.S. No. 9725, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175; Protocol
Amending the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done Mar. 25, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, 976 U.N.T.S. 3.
The United States is not party to a number of related conventions. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, done Nov. 27, 1931, 177
L.N.T.S. 373; Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs,
done June 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299; Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the
Manufacture of Internal Trade in and Use of, Prepared Opium, done Feb. 11, 1925, 51
L.N.T.S. 337; Convention Relating to Dangerous Drugs, done Feb. 19 1925, 81
L.N.T.S. 317.
101. For an extended discussion on the shortcomings and weaknesses of these agreements, specifically the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, see Note, supra note
48, at 544-50; see also infra notes 103, 141 and accompanying text (examples of escape
clauses); note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the Convention's denunciation
clause).
102. 1989 TREATIEs IN FORCE 342-43 (U.S. Dep't of State, No. 9433); Note, supra
note 48, at 544-47.
103. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 100, art. 36.
104. Id. art. 36(4).
105. Id. art. 46. One commentator suggests that these three provisions were included
to gain additional signatories, but the unfortunate result is an agreement wholly "nonobligatory" which may be "followed or ignored by any party at its discretion." Note,
supra note 48, at 548-49.
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the party states.106 Generally speaking, the power to extradite or to request extradition is captured solely within the four corners of each
treaty.107 Most extradition treaties with the United States, unfortunately,
are under-inclusive and out of date vis-A-vis the growing need for narcot-

ics control.10 8
Three factors account for the deficiencies in the international extradition system which undermine, United States efforts to apprehend drug
traffickers. First, there exists under international law a well-established
doctrine of speciality.' 0 9 Under this rule, the requesting state may prosecute the extradited offender only for an offense described in the treaty
under which he was requested and surrendered. 1 In recognition of
states' traditional competence to provide sanctuary, 1 the doctrine of
speciality evolved to protect the right of a sovereign state to refuse to
deliver a requested political refugee for a common criminal offense when
once inside the requesting state the refugee would be tried for political
11 2
offenses,
The doctrine of speciality creates a large problem for the extradition
of drug traffickers. In the historical evolution of narcotics, newer, more
potent, and unique drugs develop faster than extradition treaties can account for them. This problem' is especially acute today with the continued experimentation in so-called designer drugs-drugs created by

106. See, e.g., United States v :Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1981) ("tUinder
international law, it is the contracting foreign government... that would have the right
to complain about a [treaty] violation."); see also United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,
510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975) ("The provisions [of a treaty] are designed to protect the
sovereignty of states, and it is plainly the offended states which must in the first instance
determine whether a violation of sovereignty [has] occurred ....").

107. This is not to say that theUnited States Government cannot request extradition
for a nondelineated offense, In Fiocconi v. Attorney General, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that because no provision for narcotic offenses existed in an 1868 extradition
treaty with Italy, the extradition of the defendants for conspiring to import heroin was
an act of comity on the part of the Italian Government. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 481-82.
108. See I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at 41, 132; see also Note, supra note 40, at
300.
109. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine of
speciality).
110. See I M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 359-60; I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at
146.
111. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
112. See Sakellar, Acquisition,of Jurisdictionover CriminalDefendants by Forcible
Abduction: Strict Adherence to Ker-Frisbie Frustrates United States ForeignPolicy and
Obligations,2 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (1978).
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changing the chemical composition of other illicit substances. 113 Drug
manufacturers, for example, can process epadu, a coca-like alkaloid derived from a small tree found in Colombian forests, into a drug that is
forty percent less potent than cocaine and sixty percent less in price."1 '
Manufacturers can also process black tar heroin, a newer form of heroin
with a greater purity, from Mexican poppies at a lower cost than other
forms of heroin. " 5 The 1990s have already seen the introduction of ice,
a synthetic, smokable form of crystal methamphetamine that law enforcement officials say will replace crack, heroin, and PCP.116 Drug producers can manufacture designer drugs, including ice, with easily purchased medical ingredients.117 United States drug enforcement officials
already have intercepted shipments from Tawan, Hong Kong, Thailand, the Philippines, and Korea. "
The closely related doctrine of double criminality is a second factor
lending to the weaknesses in the international extradition system. For an
individual to be extradited for a specifically delineated criminal act, both
states must recognize the offense and punish violators with roughly the
same penalties.1 1 9 This doctrine serves to further reciprocity between
1 20
states.
Problems arise from this doctrine for two reasons: first, the laws and
institutions of states vary on the penalties assessed for similar crimes;
and second, one state does not always consider a crime to be of the same
severity as does another state." 1 In the context of drug enforcement,
many nations do not recognize drug production and sales as crimes in a
fashion similar to that of the United States. Even if such activities are
recognized as crimes, bribery, corruption, and outright terrorism make
enforcement lax. On this score, Professor Inciardi writes:
Perhaps the most pervasive problem in the political arena is the wholesale corruption of individuals and institutions. In some trafficking areas,
corruption is so widespread in the justice system, banking, the legal profession, military, the diplomatic corps, customs, and general government
that it is often viewed as part of the natural order of things....
113. See J. INCIARDI, supra note 15, at 69.
114.
115.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
137-38.
121.

Id. at 214.
Id.

See Sager, The Ice Age, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 8, 1990, at 53, 57.
Id.
Id.
See I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at 137; see also Note, supra note 40, at 300.
See 1 M. BAssiotm, supra note 88, at 324; I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at
See S. BEDI, supra note 93, at 70.
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In Latin America, enforcement of the drug laws is so limited that U.S.
officials have charged that Cuban President Fidel Castro and officials of
neighboring countries actually encourage drug sales as a revenue source.
In Colombia, as an outgrowth of President Belisario Betancur's efforts
against drug syndicates, it was found that no less than 400 judges had
been corrupted by drug-related bribe money. . . . Similarly, it would appear that drug-related corruption permeated the governments of the Bahamas, Belize, and the Caribbean Turks and Caicos Islands. For Peru, coca
is the single largest export, pumping almost $1 billion into the fragile
1 22
economy-made possible by corruption in government and the military.
The last problem with formal extradition confronting the United
States concerns extradition of nationals from a sovereign state. Most extradition treaties contain no obligation on the part of the host state to
extradite its own nationals. 123 Typically, either the treaty absolutely bars
the surrender of nationals, or it leaves the matter to the discretion of the
requested state; the requested state "shall be under no obligation" to de1
liver up its own nationals. 12
The lack of a mandatory requirement on
home states to extradite their nationals possibly presents the biggest hurdle to United States narcotics enforcement because many of the major
drug traffickers are nationals of drug producing states.1 25
The United States has made some inroads in its extradition treaties. 2 8
The United States Senate ratified new extradition treaties with Thailand, 127 Costa Rica, 28 Jamaica, 2 " and Italy 3 0 on 28 June 1984. One
year earlier, the Senate ratified a similar extradition treaty with

122. J. INCIARDI, supra note 15, at 194-95 (footnotes omitted).
123. See infra notes 132-33, 142 and accompanying text.
124. See I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at 94; 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 457.
125. The Medellin cartel of Colombia provides a good example. See generally infra
notes 60-84 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Note, supra note 40, at 300.
127. Treaty on Extradition, done Dec. 14, 1983, United States-Thailand, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 16, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter Thailand Extradition
Treaty], reprinted in 2 I. KAvAss & A. SPRUDZS, supra note 63, at 880.3.
128. Treaty on Extradition, done Dec. 4, 1982, United States-Costa Rica, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 17, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (not yet in force) [hereinafter Costa
Rica Extradition Treaty], reprinted in 1 1. KAVASS & A. SPRUDzS, supra note 63, at
160.1.
129. Treaty on Extradition, done June 14, 1983, United States-Jamaica, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 18, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter Jamaica Extradition Treaty],
reprinted in 1 I. KAVASS & A. SPRUD-S, supra note 63, at 460.3.
130. Treaty on Extradition, done Oct. 12, 1983, United States-Italy, - U.S.T. -,
T.I.A.S. No. 10837 (entered into force Sept. 24, 1984) [hereinafter Italy Extradition
Treaty].

KER-FRISBIE DOCTRINE

1990]

Colombia. 8 1
The Italian treaty is the only one of the five new treaties that includes
an absolute mandate to extradite nationals; " the other four leave extradition of nationals to the discretion of the requested state. 8 Only the
Colombian treaty specifically includes narcotics offenses as extraditable
crimes;' 8 the other four do not list offenses but rely on the doctrine of
double criminality to define extraditable acts.1 5 The Italian treaty is the
only one of these five treaties currently in force; the treaties with Thailand, Costa Rica, and Jamaica have yet to enter into force. 6 The Colombia Supreme Court recently declared unconstitutional the Colombian
treaty.2

37

The remainder of the extradition treaties between the United States
and other drug producing states is an out-of-date patchwork of agreements, some dating back to the turn of the twentieth century.13 8 A num-

131. See Colombia Extradition Treaty, supra note 63.
132. See Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 130, art. IV.
133. See Thailand Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, art. VIII(l); Costa Rica Extradition Treaty, supra note 128, art. VIII(l); Jamaica Extradition Treaty, supra note
129, art. VII(l); Colombia Extradition Treaty, supra note 63, art. VIII(l).
134. See Colombia Extradition Treaty, supra note 63, art. II(1), app. para. 21. The
schedule of offenses set forth in the appendix is a nonexclusive list, and the treaty relies
on the doctrine of double criminality to define additional offenses not included in the
schedule. Id. art. II(1)(b).
135. The treaties with Italy, Thailand, Costa Rica, and Jamaica all define an extraditable offense as an act punishable under the laws of both contracting parties by imprisonment or deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of one year or more. Also included as extraditable offenses are conspiracies or attempts to commit the above acts.
These treaties hold as irrelevant different categorization or different terminology of an
alleged act between the contracting parties. See Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 130,
art. II; Thailand Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, art. II; Costa Rica Extradition
Treaty, supra note 128, art. II; Jamaica Extradition Treaty, supra note 129, art. II.
136. Thailand has delayed ratification of its treaty, although no explanation has been
provided. See 2 I. KAvAss & A. SPRUDZS, supra note 63, at 880.1. Ratification by the
Costa Rican Government has been delayed by further negotiations. See 1 id. at 160.1.
Ratification is also pending in Jamaica. Id. at 460.1.
137. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, done Apr. 21, 1900, United States-Bolivia, 32
Stat. 1857, T.S. No. 399; Treaty Providing for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from
Justice, done Apr. 6, 1904, United States-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2265, T.S. No. 440; Protocol
Amending Spanish Text, done Dec. 6, 1904, United States-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2273, T.S.
No. 441; Additional Treaty on Extradition, done Jan. 14, 1926, United States-Cuba, 44
Stat. 2392, T.S. No. 737 (supplementing treaty of Apr. 6, 1904); Treaty for the Mutual
Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, done Aug. 9, 1904, United States-Haiti, 34 Stat.
2858, T.S. No. 447; Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, done
Jan. 15, 1909, United States-Honduras, 37 Stat. 1616, T.S. No. 569; Supplementary
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ber of these older treaties include activity in narcotics in their list of
extraditable offenses.1 3 9 The agreements with the Bahamas, Barbados,
Burma, Pakistan, Brazil, Cuba, and Honduras, however, define narcotics activities in such a broad way as to render the treaties ineffective. 40
Other treaties contain escape clauses whereby the requested state has the
option either to extradite or prosecute the accused itself or the requested
state has the option to implement its own or the requesting state's statute
of limitations to bar extradition of the accused for narcotics offenses."'

Extradition Convention, done Feb. 21, 1927, 45 Stat. 2489, T.S. No. 761; Treaty Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, done May 25, 1904, United States-Panama, 34
Stat. 2851, T.S. No. 445; Treaty on Extradition, done Nov. 28, 1899, United StatesPeru, 31 Stat. 1921, T.S. No. 288.
139. See Treaty on Extradition, done Dec. 22, 1931, United States-United Kingdom,
art. 111(2), 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849, 163 L.N.T.S. 59 (effective in Bahamas, Barbados, Burma, and Pakistan by operation of state succession); Treaty on Extradition, done
June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, app. para. 12, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S.
No. 8468 (effective in Belize by operation of state succession); Treaty of Extradition,
done Jan. 13, 1961, United States-Brazil, art. 11(27), 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S. No.
5691; Additional Protocol, done June 18, 1962, United States-Brazil, 15 U.S.T. 2112,
T.I.A.S. No. 5961; Treaty Providing for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, done Apr. 6, 1904, United States-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2265, T.S. No. 440, as amended by
Protocol Amending Spanish Text, done Dec. 6, 1904, United States-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2273,
T.S. No. 441, and by Additional Treaty on Extradition, done Jan. 14, 1926, United
States-Cuba, art. 11(21), 44 Stat. 2392, T.S. No. 737; Treaty for the Mutual Extradition
of Fugitives from Justice, done Jan. 15, 1909, United States-Honduras, 37 Stat. 1616,
T.S. No. 569, as amended by Supplementary Extradition Convention, done Feb. 21,
1927, art. 1(21), 45 Stat. 2489, T.S. No. 761; Treaty on Extradition, done May 4, 1978,
United States-Mexico, app. para. 14, 31 U.S.T. 5061, T.I.A.S. No. 9656; Treaty on
Extradition, done May 24, 1973, United States-Paraguay, art. 11(17), 25 U.S.T. 967,
T.I.A.S. No. 7838.
140. See, e.g, Treaty on Extradition, done Dec. 22, 1931, United States-United
Kingdom, art. 111(2), 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849 (effective in Bahamas, Barbados,
Burma, and Pakistan by operation of state succession) ("Crimes or offenses or attempted
crimes or offenses in connection with the traffic in dangerous drugs."); Treaty of Extradition, done Jan. 13, 1961, United States-Brazil, art. 11(27), 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S."
No. 5691 ("Crimes or offenses against the laws relating to traffic in, use of, or production and manufacture of, narcotic drugs or cannabis."); Additional Treaty on Extradition, done Jan. 14, 1926, United States-Cuba, art. 11(21), 44 Stat. 2392, T.S. No. 737
("Crimes against the laws for the suppression of the traffic in narcotic products.");
Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, done Jan. 15, 1909, United
States-Honduras, 37 Stat. 1616, T.S. No. 569, as amended by Supplementary Extradition Convention, done Feb. 21, 1927, art. 1(21), 45 Stat. 2489, T.S. No. 761 ("Crimes
against the laws for the suppression of the traffic in narcotic products.").
141. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, done Jan. 13, 1961, United States-Brazil, art
V(1), 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S. No. 5691 ("Extradition shall not be granted in any of
the following circumstances: 1) When the requested State is competent, according to its
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Nearly all of these treaties leave extradition of nationals to the discretion
of the requested state. 142 The existing treaties with Bolivia, Haiti, Panama, and Peru all fail to include narcotics offenses outright within their
lists of extraditable acts.1 43 Additionally, as of this writing, the United
States has not negotiated extradition treaties with the drug-producing
states of Afghanistan, Laos, and Iran.

IV.

THE ALTERNATIVES: ABDUCTION AND IRREGULAR RENDITION

A. Abduction versus Irregular Rendition
The practice of extralegal apprehension in lieu of extradition is
neither new nor unfamiliar in the international community. In the twentieth century alone, a number of states, including Great Britain and
Israel utilized the practice. In the Savarkararbitration,1 44 a British sub-

laws, to prosecute the person whose surrender is sought for the crime or offense for
which that person's extradition is requested and the requested State intends to exercise
its jurisdiction."); Treaty on Extradition, done May 24, 1973, United States-Paraguay,
art. V(1), (3), 25 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7838 (Extradition shall not be granted
"[w]hen the person whose surrender is sought is being proceeded against or has been
tried and discharged or punished in the territory of the Requested Party for the offense
for which his extradition is requested ... [or] ... [w]hen the prosecution or the enforce-

ment of the penalty for the offense has become barred by lapse of time according to the
laws of either of the Contracting Parties.").
142. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, done Apr. 21, 1900, United States-Bolivia, art.
V, 32 Stat. 1857, T.S. No. 399; Treaty of Extradition, done Jan. 13, 1961, United
States-Brazil, art. VII, 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S. No. 5691; Additional Protocol, done
June 18, 1962, United States-Brazil, art. I, 15 U.S.T. 2112, T.I.A.S. No. 5961; Treaty
Providing for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, done Apr. 6, 1904,
United States-Cuba, art. V, 33 Stat. 2265, T.S. No. 440; Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, done Aug. 9, 1904, United States-Haiti, art. IV, 34 Stat.
2858, T.S. No. 447; Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, done
Jan. 15, 1909, United States-Honduras, art. VIII, 37 Stat. 1616, T.S. No. 569; Treaty
on Extradition, done May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, art. IX, 31 U.S.T. 5061,
T.I.A.S. No. 9656; Treaty Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, done May 25,
1904, United States-Panama, art. V, 34 Stat. 2851, T.S. No. 445; Treaty on Extradition,
done May 24, 1973, United States-Paraguay, art. IV, 25 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7838;
Treaty on Extradition, done Nov. 28, 1899, United States-Peru, art. V, 31 Stat. 1921,
T.S. No. 288.
143. See Treaty on Extradition, done Apr. 21, 1900, United States-Bolivia, art. II,
32 Stat. 1857, T.S. No. 399; Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, done Aug. 9, 1904, United States-Haiti, art. II, 34 Stat. 2858, T.S. No. 447; Treaty
Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, done May 25, 1904, United States-Panama,
art. II, 34 Stat. 2851, T.S. No. 445; Treaty on Extradition, done Nov. 28, 1899, United
States-Peru, art. II, 31 Stat. 1921, T.S. No. 288.
144. Savarkar Case (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.) Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 775 (Penn. Ct. Arb.
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ject being extradited from Great Britain to India escaped from the British delivery ship while in Marseille, France. The Permanent Court of
Arbitration considered whether the British Government, after recapturing the subject, had to return him to France. Noting that French police
actually assisted in Savarkar's reapprehension, the Court determined
that there was no rule of international law mandating the return of an
individual captured in such a manner.1 45
More remarkable is the case of Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, ' in which Israeli agents traveled to Argentina and abducted accused Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann. At trial, Eichmann made several challenges to the jurisdiction of the Israeli court.1 4 One claim
attacked the method of apprehension used to secure his custody within
Israel. Eichman contended that the extralegal apprehension violated international law and thus deprived the Israeli court of jurisdiction. 4" The
District Court of Jerusalem answered that "[i]t is an established rule of
law that a person being tried for an offence against the laws of a State
may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegality of his arrest or of the
means whereby he was brought within the jurisdiction of that State."'1 4 9
Israel was implicated in two other notable acts of extralegal apprehension in the 1980s. In 1984, Great Britain charged three Israelis and a
Nigerian diplomat with the attempted kidnapping of former Nigerian
official Umaru Dikko.' 5 0 The drugged Dikko was found at an airport
1911); see I. SHEARER,supra note 87, at 72-73.
145. See I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at 73.
146. 45 Pesakim Mehoziim 3 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1965), reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 5
(1968) (translation).
147. Among his challenges, Eichmann claimed that the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Law could not, by operation of international law, apply to a citizen of a
foreign state because the law prohibited-ex post facto-offenses committed before the
establishment of the state of Israel. 36 I.L.R. at 10 (summary of judgment). Eichmann
also claimed that his actions constituted acts of state and thus were immune to adjudication by the Israeli court. Id.
The court responded to the challenge that the law was ex post facto and held that,
because Eichmann's crimes were universal in character and specifically intended to exterminate the Jewish people, Israel could assume jurisdiction under the universality, the
passive personality, and the protective principles of international law. Id. The court defeated Eichmann's act of state claim by relying on the repudiation of the doctrine by the
International Military Tribunal, by the United States Military Tribunal, and in the
formulation of the Nuremburg Principles by the International Law Commission. Id. at
12.
148. Id. at 10.
149. Id. at 59.
150. Thomas, Britain Charges Three Israelis and Nigerian in Kidnapping of Exile, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1984, at A4, col. 3. Both the Israeli and Nigerian Governments
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outside London in a crate labeled "diplomatic baggage" and addressed to

a government minister in Lagos."' Two years later, another Israeli,
Mordechai Vanunu, divulged information to the London Times proving

that, contrary to the Israeli Government's constant denial, Israel had
stockpiled the sixth largest nuclear arsenal in the world. 5' Prior to the

publication of the story on 5 October 1986, Vanunu vanished from
London. Vanunu reappeared shortly thereafter in Israeli custody, claiming that Israeli authorities kidnapped him.' 5 3 At Vanunu's trial on

charges of espionage and treason, the Israeli court promptly dismissed
Vanunu's jurisdictional challenge.' 5
The extralegal apprehension typically takes one of two forms: abduction or irregular rendition." The responsibilities and conduct of the apprehending and holding states distinguish the two forms. Abduction occurs when agents of the apprehending state, acting under color of law,
seize the alleged offender without the cooperation or acquiescence of the
holding state.'" The apprehension of Eichmann and Vanunu, and possi-

bly that of Verdugo, illustrate the concept of abduction.1" Irregular rendition involves informal, ad hoc agreements between the apprehending
and holding states, outside the extradition process, to secure rendition of
the alleged offender by the assistance or acquiescence of the holding
state."' The seizure of Juan Matta, the rendition described in the case
of United States v. Lira,'5 and, arguably, the apprehension of Verdugo
are examples of irregular rendition.

denied any involvement in the kidnapping. Id.
151. Id.
152. See I M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 199.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 13. These terms are not universal. Abduction is sometimes called
kidnapping. See, e.g., Sakellar, supra note 112. Professor Bassiouni calls irregular rendition "unlawful seizure." See 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 189-246.
156. See 1 M.

BASSIOUNI,

supra note 88, at 191-95; I.

SHEARER,

supra note 87, at

72.
157. Because the United States Government admitted to paying $32,000 to
Verdugo's six arresting officers, and because the Mexican Government claimed that the
officers were fired five days prior to the arrest, it can be argued that the officers became
agents of the United States. A converse argument would be that it was not the intent of
the United States to hire these agents, but that the United States relied on the officers'
representations that they were still bona fide foreign law enforcement personnel.
158. See 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 196.
159. 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
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United States Case Law and the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine

The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons.., against unrea-

sonable ... seizures shall not be violated. 1 0 Similarly, the fifth amendment guarantees that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of... liberty..

. without due process of law." ' Yet, for over one hundred years, the
United States has adhered to the doctrine of mala captus bene detentus.'8 2 The doctrine generally means that an illegal apprehension does
not preclude jurisdiction and, thus, courts assert in personam jurisdiction
over the accused without regard to the method of apprehension. Following the holding of the United-States Supreme Court in Ker v. Illinois in
1886,163 reaffirmed in 1952 by the Court in Frisbiev. Collins,'" United
States courts have generally upheld in personam jurisdiction over defendants brought to trial by means of extralegal apprehension, either in the
form of abduction or irregular rendition. 6
A substantial body of scholarly commentary opposes the practices embodied in the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and the application of mala captus
bene detentus.161 Arguably, the facts of Ker suggest that courts have applied the decision too broadly in support of jurisdiction in subsequent
7
cases.

16

Ker v. Illinois involved the exercise of jurisdiction by an Illinois court
over a United States citizen, Fredrick M. Ker, who lived abroad. Illinois
indicted Ker on charges of larceny and embezzlement while Ker was
residing in Peru."6 ' The Governor of Illinois petitioned the United States
Secretary of State for a warrant for the extradition of the defendant
160. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
161. Id, amend. V (emphasis added).
162. See I M. BASSIOUNr, supra note 88, at 213.
163. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
164. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
165. The exception to the Ker-Frisbierule is United States v. Toscanino, discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 185-206.
166. See 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 195.
167. Ker, for example, addressed the abduction of a United States citizen from a
foreign state. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. The abductor had extradition
documents in his possession, but could not locate the appropriate Peruvian officials to
serve them. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
Contrast this situation with United States v. Toscanino, in which Toscanino, a foreign
national, was apprehended by United States law enforcement agents without any extradition documents. See infra notes 185-197 and accompanying text. See also the facts of
Rene Verdugo's apprehension, supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text, and Juan
Matta's apprehension, supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
168. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437-38.
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under the then-existing treaty between the United States and Peru.""
On 1 March 1883, the United States President issued a warrant and
sent Henry Julian, a Pinkerton agent, to Peru to serve the document and
receive Ker from the Peruvian authorities.1 70 When Julian arrived in
Peru, however, Peru was in a state of war with neighboring Chile, and
Chilean forces occupied the capital of Peru.17 1 Although Julian was unable to locate the appropriate governmental authorities, he nevertheless
"forcibly and with violence" arrested Ker and brought him back to Illi7
1
nois.17 2 Once in Illinois, the state court convicted Ker of larceny.

8

Ker appealed his conviction to the United States Supreme Court on
the ground that his arrest violated the extradition treaty between the
United States and Peru and thus was not in accordance with due process
under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 7 4
The Supreme Court held against Ker and stated one of the most frequently cited passages used to support the doctrine mala captus bene
detentus:
The "due process of law" here guaranteed is complied with when the
party is regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the State court, has
a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and
when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which
he is lawfully entitled. .

.

. [Flor mere irregularities in the manner in

which he may be brought into the custody of the law, we do not think he
is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with
75
which he is charged in a regular indictment.1

169. Id. at 438.
170. Id. The Pinkertons were a national detective agency that ultimately became
known as the Secret Service. See generally J. HORAN, THE PINKERTONS (1967).
171. See 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 197.
172. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
173. Id. at 437.
174. Id. at 439-40. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that a state shall not "deprive any person of ... liberty . . ., without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Because the fourteenth amendment was
less than twenty years old in 1886, the Ker interpretation of United States due process
was early in the evolution of the doctrine as it is understood today. Further, it is unclear
from the opinion whether the Court intended its analysis to apply to the fourth or fifth
amendments of the Constitution in federal cases. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino interpreted Ker v. Illinois as a fourth
amendment case. See infra notes 202, 205 and accompanying text. In its opinion, however, the Toscanino court repeatedly used the phrase due process-a phrase that does not
appear anywhere in the fourth amendment. See infra notes 201, 203 and accompanying
text.
175. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440.
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Although this case involved an abduction without the cooperation of
the foreign government, the Court commented on irregular rendition in
dicta when it addressed Ker's claim of right of asylum in Peru. "Nor can
it be doubted that the government of Peru could, of its own accord, and
without demand from the United States, have surrendered Ker to an
agent of the state of Illinois, and that such surrender would have been
valid within the dominions of Peru."1 6
In response to Ker's claim that the United States violated its extradition treaty with Peru, the Court held that this "was a clear case of kidnapping," and the treaty "was not called into operation, was not relied
upon, [and] was not made the pretext of the arrest," even though Julian
possessed the requisite documents to do so. 1 7 Because the "papers remained in his pocket, and were never brought to light in Peru," the
treaty was never invoked and therefore was not violated."7 8 The Court
said that Ker was "clothed with no rights which a proceeding under the
treaty could have given him."""
The Court's decision rested on at least two grounds. First, no reason
existed to dismiss the conviction since Ker's abduction did nothing illegally to enhance the state's case at trial. This abduction at least would
not enhance the state's case as would illegally seized evidence. Second,
Ker could not assert a due process violation on the grounds of the extradition treaty because (1) the treaty was never invoked, and (2) the foreign sovereign never protested the abduction.180
176. Id. at 442.
177. Id. at 442-43.
178. Id. The Court compared this case with United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407
(1886), which was decided the same day. In Rauscher, the Court held that "when a
party was duly surrendered, by proper proceedings, under the treaty of 1842 with Great
Britain, he came to this country clothed with the protection which the nature of such
proceedings and the true construction of the treaty gave him." Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
Thus, a defendant could not be prosecuted for a crime other than that for which the
foreign government had surrendered him.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), took this language one step further. See infra notes
185-206 and accompanying text (discussing Toscanino).
179. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443. The Court did state, however, that Ker was not without
other recourse for his abduction, and suggested that Ker could sue Julian in an action for
trespass and false imprisonment. The Court noted further that the Government of Peru
could demand extradition of Julian to be tried for the crime of kidnapping. See id. at
444.
180. Traditionally, United States law holds that if a treaty provides certain benefits
to citizens of particular states, "any rights arising out of such provisions are, under international law, those of the states and ... individual rights are only derivative through the
states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115, comment e (1987).
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Sixty-six years later, Ker was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Frisbie v. Collins."81 Interestingly, the case involved no
concerns of international law, but instead focused on the allegedly illegal
rendition of the defendant from one United States state to another. Defendant Collins claimed that while living in Chicago, Michigan police
officers forcibly abducted him and took him across the Illinois state line
without utilizing proper interstate extradition procedures, in violation of
the Federal Kidnapping Act.1 82 The Court held that it had "never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois that the power of a
court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had
been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' "1"8 Thus, under the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine, "due process of law
is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having
been fairly apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards."1 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit brought
the first major attack on Ker-Frisbie in United States v. Toscanino.8 5
There, the court held that the restrictive Ker-Frisbieconcept of due process must yield to the more "expanded and enlightened [due process]
interpretation expressed in more recent decisions of the Supreme
Court."1 8 6
Toscanino involved a conspiracy between the defendant, Francisco
18 7
Toscanino, and four others to import narcotics into the United States.

181. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
182. Ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (1972) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988)).
183. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522 (citations omitted).
184. Id.
185. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
186. Id. at 275.
187. Id. at 268. Interestingly, unlike as in Ker and Frisbie,the defendant in this case
was not a United States national, but a citizen of Italy. Yet, the Second Circuit did not
rely on this fact to distinguish the case from the Ker-Frisbierule and hold that the rule
applies only to the apprehension of United States citizens abroad. The court addressed
Toscanino's citizenship only when ruling on the seizure of evidence through an allegedly
illegal wiretap. Presumably, if the other distinctions noted by the court had not existed,
the Second Circuit would have upheld jurisdiction: This was the position taken by the
Second Circuit in its subsequent decision in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 501
F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); see infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. The apparent conflict between the application of due process in the context
of the seizure of a person as against the seizure of evidence will be examined further
with a discussion of the holding in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214
(9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 1175. See infra note 310.
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On appeal from his conviction, Toscanino did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or adequacy of the proceedings in the trial
court," 8' but claimed that the jurisdiction of the trial court was unlawfully obtained "through the conduct of American agents who kidnapped
him in Uruguay, used illegal electronic surveillance, tortured him and
abducted him to the United States." '
Toscanino offered to prove that he was lured from his home in Montevideo, Uruguay by a phone call from a member of the Montevideo
police.190 Once in a deserted area, the police knocked Toscanino unconscious, bound him, blindfolded him, threw him into a car, and drove him
to the Uruguayan-Brazilian border.19 By arrangement with the1 9United
2
States, Brazilians met the car and took Toscanino into custody
Toscanino claimed that he was tortured and interrogated for seventeen
days after the Brazilians took him into custody. 9 The alleged interrogation methods included denial of food and water, beatings, alcohol forced
into Toscanino's eyes and nose, and electric shock to his ears, toes, and
genitals. 19 ' During this seventeen day period, the United States Government and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York allegedly received progress reports on the interrogation. 9 Toscanino further claimed that a member of the United States Department
of Justice actually participated in some portions of the interrogation. 8
Finally, Toscanino was placed on a flight to the United States and arrested on arrival. 97
The facts alleged by Toscanino proved too shocking for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to ignore. In what appeared to be two alternative holdings, the court remanded the case to the
district court with instructions that the district court divest itself of jurisdiction if Toscanino proved the alleged conduct of the United States

188. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 269.
189. Id. at 268.
190, Toscanino offered this evidence to prove that the police were acting ultra vires,
without the knowledge of the Uruguayan officials, and were in fact paid agents of the
United States. Id. at 269. In Verdugo, 856 F.2d at 1216, Verdugo also proffered evidence that the Mexican police were acting under the auspices of the United States. See
supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text; infra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing Verdugo).
191. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 269.
192. Id. at 269-70,
193. Id. at 270.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196, Id.
197. Id.
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agents. 198

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit appeared
ready to challenge the Ker-Frisbierule head on and framed the issue as
"whether a federal court must assume jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant who [was] illegally apprehended abroad and forcibly abducted
by government agents to the United States for the purpose of facing
criminal charges here."1 ' Judge Mansfield, writing for the court, noted
a gradual "erosion of Frisbie"' 00 by beginning his opinion with citations
to post-Frisbie United States Supreme Court decisions that "expanded
the interpretation of 'due process.' ",201 He wrote:
No longer is [due process] limited to the guarantee of "fair" procedure at
trial. In an effort to deter police misconduct, the term has been extended
to bar the government from realizing directly the fruits of its own deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness in bringing the accused to trial .... Con-

current with these decisions the Ker-Frisbie rule has been criticized and
its continued validity repeatedly questioned.20 2
Accordingly, the court found that
the "Ker-Frisbie" rule cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's expansion of the concept of due process ....
Faced with a conflict between the two concepts of due process, the one
being the restricted version found in Ker-Frisbie and the other the expanded and enlightened interpretation expressed in more recent decisions
of the Supreme Court, we are persuaded that to the extent that the two
203
are in conflict, the Ker-Frisbie version must yield.

198. On remand, Toscanino was unable to prove his allegations. The court therefore
refused to divest itself of jurisdiction and upheld Toscanino's conviction. United States v.
Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
199. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 271.
200. Id. at 273.
201. Id. at 272.
202. Id. (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
Judge Mansfield also cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), decided the
same term as Frisbie, which set aside a state court conviction resting on evidence procured by police brutality. In Rochin, police recovered two morphine capsules, which
were swallowed by the defendant, by forcing "an emetic solution through a tube into [the
defendant's] stomach against his will." Id. at 166, quoted in Toscanino, 500 F.2d at
273.

203. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. Some commentators interpret this language as
dicta. See, e.g., 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 202. Others find this language controlling. See, e.g., Findlay, supra note 97, at 48-49.
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In a secondary holding, the court distinguished Ker and Frisbie on the
basis that, although the abduction of Toscanino from Uruguay did not
violate the extradition treaty between the United States and Uruguay,
the kidnapping violated two other international treaties-the United Nations Charter and the Organization of American States Charter-which
require the United States to respect the territorial sovereignty of
4
Uruguay."0
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
appeared to lay a broad foundation for its holding,2 05 its test was comparatively narrow. The court held that on remand the district court must
divest itself of jurisdiction "where it has been acquired as the result of
the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of
the accused's constitutional rights." 2
Although the Second Circuit failed to define what constitutes an invasion of a defendant's rights, it provided that definition one year later in
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler.2 07 After the Toscanino decision, 208 a slightly different panel of the Second Circuit substantially

204. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276-77. "Since the United States thus agreed not to
seize persons residing within the territorial limits of Uruguay, appellant's allegations in
this case are governed not by Ker, but by . . . Cook v. United States."

Id. at 278

(citation omitted). On this point, Judge Anderson disagreed, finding that the case could
be "disposed of on due process grounds alone." Id. at 281 (Anderson, J. concurring).
Echoing the opinion of Ker, Anderson claimed that Toscanino "did not enter this country
pursuant to any treaty; he is, therefore, not 'clothed' in any treaty rights and cannot
invoke the extradition treaty or the charters of the Organization of American States and
the United Nations as personal defenses." Id. (citation omitted).
205. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Government "unlawfully seized the defendant in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
275. Because the conviction was the illegal "fruit" of Toscanino's apprehension, "the
government should be denied the right to exploit its own illegal conduct." Id.; see also
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975).
206. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
207. 510 F.2d 62.
208. An en banc hearing was denied four months after the decision. In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Mulligan criticized the majority opinion as a decision "without any discernible authority." United States v. Toscanino, 504 F.2d 1380, 1381 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Mulligan, J., dissenting). On the holding that the court should divest itself of jurisdiction if such jurisdiction were acquired as a result of a kidnapping by United States
agents, Judge Mulligan found that the majority decision "controverts the holding of the
Supreme Court in Frisbie v. Collins." Id. (citation omitted). Judge Mulligan sided with
Judge Anderson's earlier concurring opinion and declared "unprecedented" the decision
to allow Toscanino personally to avail himself of the protections of the charters of the
United Nations and the Organization of American States. Id.
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limited Toscanino in Lujan.2 0 9 With facts described as "a grade-B film
scenario,"21 0 the case involved the extralegal apprehension of Julio
Juventino Lujan, an Argentine citizen. Lujan was indicted for his part
in an organized underworld conspiracy to import heroin into the United
States.211 Lujan, a pilot, was hired by an undercover United States agent
to fly to Bolivia. Once there, Lujan was arrested by Bofivian police, acting ultra vires as paid agents of the United States.21 2 Six days later, he
was placed on a plane for New York by Bolivian and United States
authorities and arrested by United States agents upon his arrival. 1 3 In
an action under a writ of habeas corpus, Lujan argued in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for release on the basis of
21 4
Toscanino.
The Second Circuit refused to release Lujan.21 5 Limiting Toscanino to
its facts, Judge Kaufman recognized that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine "no
longer provide[s] a carte blanche to government agents bringing defendants from abroad to the United States by the use of torture, brutality and
similar outrageous conduct."2 1 The court, however, did conclude:
[W]e did not intend to suggest that any irregularity in the circumstances
of a defendant's arrival in the jurisdiction would vitiate the proceedings of
the criminal court. In holding that Ker and Frisbie must yield to the extent they were inconsistent with the Supreme Court's more recent pronouncements we scarcely could have meant to eviscerate the Ker-Frisbie
rule, which the Supreme Court has never felt impelled to disavow.2" 7
The Lujan court limited the applicability of Toscanino to circumstances of "government conduct of a most shocking and outrageous char-

209. 510 F.2d 62. The panel consisted of Judges Anderson and Oakes, who participated in Toscanino, and Chief Judge Kaufman, who wrote the majority opinion in place
of Judge Mansfield.
210. Id. at 63.
211. Toscanino was apparently part of this conspiracy also. By the time arrest warrants were issued for this indictment, however, Toscanino had already been tried on
another conspiracy. See id.
212. Similar to those involved in Verdugo's apprehension, see supra notes 17-19 and
accompanying text, the agents in Lujan's apprehension were "Bolivian police who were
not acting at the direction of their own superiors or government, but as paid agents of the
United States." Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 63-64.
215. Id. at 68.
216. Id. at 65.
217. Id. (emphasis in original).
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acter."' 18 Because Lujan disclaimed any act of torture or interrogation
on the part of United States
or Bolivian personnel, he was not entitled to
2 19
relief under Toscanino.
Unlike Toscanino, Lujan could not rely on the charters of the United
Nations and the Organization of American States. Although the court
recognized that the "provisions [of the charters] in question are designed
to protect the sovereignty of states," the court found it significant that
Lujan failed "to allege that either Argentina or Bolivia in any way protested or even objected to his abduction."2' 2 0 The court found this omission "fatal" 2 2' because Lujan was not personally clothed with the rights
described in the charters.2 22 The Lujan court, therefore, read in another
requirement to the Toscanino exception: formal protest of the sovereign
whose boundaries have been violated. This requirement is now the con-

218. Id. The Reporters of the Restatement Third of ForeignRelations adopted this
approach to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine: "A person apprehended in a foreign state, whether
by foreign or by United States officials, and delivered to the United States, may be prosecuted in the United States unless his apprehension or delivery was carried out in such
reprehensible manner as to shock the conscience of civilized society." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 433(2) (1987).
219. See Lujan, 510 F.2d at 66 ("[W]e are forced to recognize that, absent a set of
incidents like that in Toscanino, not every violation by prosecution or police is so egregious that [it] requires nullification of the indictment.").
220. Id. at 67. This distinction appears to stretch the holding of Toscanino. The
Toscanino court only noted that "the Uruguayan government claims that it had no prior
knowledge of the kidnapping nor did it consent thereto and had indeed condemned this
kind of apprehension as alien to its laws." Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 270. The claims of
the Uruguayan Government, however, could have been a public disclaimer of a covert
arrangement with the United States. In any event, Toscanino did not allege that Uruguay filed a formal protest, and it does not appear that the Toscanino court relied on
such a protest for its alternative, holding.
The Lujan court wrote, "We believe that to support this claim [of protest], Toscanino
would have to prove that the Uruguayan government registered an official protest with
the United States Department of State." Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67 n.8.
221. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67.
222. Judge Anderson, concurring as he did in Toscanino on due process grounds,
agreed with this interpretation. Anderson cited the denial of the en banc hearing of Toscanino and was of the opinion that
[i]n so doing the majority obviously interpreted the decision in Toscanino as resting solely and exclusively upon the use of torture and other cruel and inhumane
treatment of Toscanino in effecting his kidnapping and it rejected the proposition
that a kidnapping of a foreign national from his own or another nation and his
forcible delivery into the United States against his will, but without torture, would
itself violate due process. This interpretation of Toscanino has become the law of
this Circuit.
Id. at 69 (Anderson, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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trolling factor on the issue of jurisdiction.223
The vitality of the Toscanino exception is suspect. Shortly after Lujan, the United States Supreme Court, in Gerstein v. Pugh,22 ' refused to
"retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not
void a subsequent conviction." '2 5 Lower courts either distinguish Tos227
canino along the lines of Lujan,2 8 or reject Toscanino outright.
United States v. Cordero228 further constricted the definition of treatment that would "shock the conscience of the court." During a United
States Drug Enforcement Agency operation, Panamanian authorities arrested appellants Josephine Cordero and William Sorren and two others
in Panama. 229 From Panama, the appellants were sent to Venezuela and
then to Puerto Rico, where United States officials arrested them. 3 0 After
Cordero and Sorren were convicted for conspiring to import cocaine into
the customs territory of the United States, they challenged the district

223. See, e.g., Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 ("Treaties are contracts between or
among independent nations. The treaty provisions in question were designed to protect
the sovereign interests of nations, and it is up to the offended nations to determine
whether a violation of sovereign interests occurred and requires redress."); United States
v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[U]nder international law, it is the contracting foreign government, not the defendant, that would have the right to complain
about a [treaty] violation."). The Reporters of the Restatement also note that "[u]nder
prevailing practice . . .states ordinarily refrain from trying persons illegally brought
from another state only if that state demands the person's return." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

§ 432 n.3 (1987).

224. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
225. Id. at 119; see also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988); David v.
Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1983); Letterman v. Rushen, 704 F.2d 442
(9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v.
Fielding, 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1981);
Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d
308 (9th Cir. 1980).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404
(5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); United States v.
Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974).
228. 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981).
229. Id. at 35. Unlike Toscanino and Lujan, in which it was debatable whether the
apprehensions at issue were accurately labeled abductions or irregular renditions, this
case offers a clear instance of irregular rendition, because the officers of both involved
states were acting at the behest of their respective governments, not as paid agents of the
United States. Id.
230. Id. at 35-36.

420
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court's jurisdiction on the basis of Toscanino.23 1 The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declined to apply the Toscanino
exception. The court stated:
[T]he record does not show the outrageous conduct involved in Toscanino. At worst, it shows poor treatment by the Panamanianauthorities
and poor conditions in Panamanianjails. When Panamanian officials arrested Sorren they insulted him, pushed him and slapped him. In jail,
Sorren was poorly fed, he had to sleep on the floor and had to "huddle up
in a comer" to avoid the splashing of urine coming from prisoners in
other cells. The Panamanian arresting officers insulted Cordero. They
also fed her badly while she was in jail. She had to sleep on the floor or in
a chair. These conditions may be poor, unfortunate, hardly decent, but
they are a far cry from deliberate torture, and they are beyond the control

of American law enforcement authorities and American courts. Were
American courts to seek to improve conditions in foreign jails by refusing
to try those who are temporarily held there, the result would not be better
jails, but the creation of safe1 havens in foreign lands for those fleeing the
23
reach of American justice.
Nor did the court find convincing the appellants' argument that their
apprehension violated the procedures outlined in existing extradition
treaties with Panama and Venezuela. The court recognized that "extra233
dition treaties are made for the benefit of the governments concerned,1
and stated, "[t]o hold that extradition treaties forbid foreign nations to
return criminal defendants except in accordance with the formal procedures they contain, would insofar as we are aware, represent a novel
interpretation of those treaties." 2 The First Circuit, like other courts,
therefore, refused to apply Toscanino absent a showing of United States
involvement in deliberate torture.23 5
Recent cases clearly demonstrate the continued application of the KerFrisbie doctrine. In upholding jurisdiction, United States federal district
and appellate courts cite the Ker-Frisbie doctrine without hesitation,

231.

Id. at 36.

232. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 38.

235. Id. at 36 (citing United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1976) (abduction at instigation of United States but absent direct United States involvement in torture
insufficient to divest court of jurisdiction); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.
1976) (no Toscanino violation where defendant failed to show direct United States involvement in torture; forcible abduction without more insufficient); United States v. Lira,
515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975) (no Toscanino violation without showing direct United States involvement)).
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while usually distinguishing Toscanino on its facts.23 In 1988, one defendant, convicted on seven counts of possession and distribution of marijuana, actually acknowledged "that even though American officials kidnap a criminal defendant from a foreign jurisdiction, a federal district
court has jurisdiction to try him.., unless governmental conduct is so
'outrageous' or 'shocking to the conscience' as to constitute a deprivation
of the defendant's Fifth Amendment due process rights."23 7 In that case,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disposed of the
jurisdiction issue on the basis of Ker-Frisbiein three paragraphs of the
court's opinion.2"8 In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, defendant
Verdugo, after losing on the jurisdiction issue in the lower court, did not
bother to challenge the ruling on appeal.23 9
As to the recent trend toward findings of jurisdiction absent extreme
brutality at the hands of United States officials during abduction, Professor Bassiouni laments that
for all practical purposes, the judiciary has largely abandoned any concerns for the integrity of the judicial process in the face of practical exigencies which facilitate the work of this government in its prosecutorial
function, as well as that of other governments' law enforcement agencies
working together to apprehend wanted offenders or alleged offenders. The
reading of decisions gives the inescapable feeling that courts reach a judgment on the criminality of the accused and then decide as to how to avoid
applying a legal rule that would negate criminal jurisdiction and thus allow the relator to go free. The resulting signals to U.S. law enforcement
officers are encouraging and lead to more of that practice.2 40
In 1977, Professors Abramovsky and Eagle criticized the continued
application of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine on the ground that it cuts against
the landmark Paquete Habana case24 x that integrated international law

236.

See, e.g., David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1983).

237. United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit accepted the appellant's characterization of
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine as a fifth amendment issue. Contrast this case with United
States v. Toscanino, in which the Second Circuit interpreted Ker-Frisbie as a fourth
amendment issue. See supra note 205.
It is possible that the Fifth Circuit in Zabaneh was referring implicitly to the fifth
amendment's prohibition of illegally coerced confessions, an issue that was also before the
Second Circuit in Toscanino. The Zabaneh court may have been saying that Toscanino
would only apply in cases of illegally coerced confessions.
238. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d at 1261.
239. 856 F.2d 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 1175.
240. 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 212.
241. 175 U.S. 677 (1900), discussed in Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 13, at 64.
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as part of United States law.2 ' Citing Paquete Habana,these commentators reason that "where a federal statute does not provide to the contrary, customary international law governs. '

243

Furthermore, "'unless it

unmistakably appears that a congressional act was intended to be in disregard of a principle of international comity, the presumption is that it
was intended to be in conformity with it.' At present no federal statute
exists which either permits or sanctions abduction.

' 24 4

When Abramov-

sky and Eagle criticized the continued application of the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine, however, a federal statute on this issue was just beginning to
evolve.2

45

C. Federal Legislation and the Evolution of the Mansfield
Amendment
As part of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976,46 the United States Congress enacted the Mansfield Amendment 4 7 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in direct response to Toscanino. As originally written, the Mansfield Amendment
expressly barred United States civilian personnel from "engaging or participating in direct police arrest actions in any foreign country in connection with narcotics control efforts." 2'8 The purpose of the provision was
to "insure that U.S. narcotics control efforts abroad are conducted in
such a manner as to avoid involvement by U.S. personnel in foreign police operations where violence or the use of force could reasonably be
anticipated. '" 2 49 The Mansfield Amendment was the first congressional
attempt to legislate away the practice of abduction by United States law
enforcement officials abroad.
The enactment of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978

242. The Supreme Court held:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
243. Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 13, at 64.
244. Id. (quoting Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925)).
245. See infra part IV, section C (discussing the Mansfield Amendment).
246. Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729.
247. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (1988).
248. H.R. REP. No. 1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1378, 1430.
249. Id. at 55, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1431.
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expanded the Mansfield Amendment. 5 ' Without expressly mentioning
Toscanino, a decision by then four years old, Congress prohibited "any
agent or employee ... from interrogating, or from being present at the
interrogation of, any U.S. person arrested in any foreign country in the
absence of the written consent of the person arrested."25' 1 By including
this provision, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs noted a number
of "reports that agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration in their
overseas work may have violated the Mansfield Amendment. 2' 5 2 The
Committee decided to "further limit DEA's activities" because it felt that
"DEA's primary emphasis overseas should be on intelligence gathering
. . . related to organizations involved in major drug trafficking."'2 53 The
Senate Committee may have gone too far with this provision. Although
these original Mansfield Amendment prohibitions survive today,2 54 they
came under attack just seven years aftertheir enactment.
In early 1985, at the start of the second term of the Administration of
United States President Ronald Reagan, the United States Senate attempted to repeal the Mansfield Amendment. 5 The Senate wished to
allow the heads of departments and agencies to develop their own regulations regarding the conduct of their employees in antinarcotics activities
or interrogations overseas.2 56 Such a provision would have relaxed significantly the constraints on the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
and would have provided a broader scope of authority lawfully to arrest
suspected drug traffickers in light of Ker-Frisbie. The attempt of the
Senate failed, however, in the face of a simultaneous bill of the United
States House of Representatives.
During the time that the Senate planned to repeal the Mansfield
Amendment, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs recognized that
"[t]he practical effect of [the Amendment's] prohibition on participation
in narcotics police actions has been to deny U.S. personnel the opportu151
nity to monitor and assist host country personnel in such actions."
Congress, therefore, carved out an exception to the Mansfield Amendment in the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of

250.
251.
CONG.

252.
253.
254.
255.
CONG.
256.
257.

Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 3, 92 Stat. 730.
S. REP. No. 841, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
& ADMIN. NE.Ws 1833, 1845.
Id.
Id.
See 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(1), (5).
See S. REP. No. 960, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 130, reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE
& ADMIN. NE-WS 158, 239.
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 39, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1985).
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1985.258 Although Congress retained the ban on direct arrest and interrogation without consent, the Mansfield Amendment no longer "prohibit[ed] officers and employees of the United States from being present
during direct police arrest actions with respect to narcotic control efforts
in a foreign country to the extent that the Secretary of State and the
government of that country agree to such an exemption."' " This provision enabled the United States Secretary of State and the host state to
decide when to apply the Mansfield Amendment and gave United States
civilian law enforcement officials a wider range of authority abroad by
opening the door to legalizing irregular rendition.
This attempt to limit the Mansfield Amendment, however, proved impracticable. One year after the provision was enacted, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs found it "unworkable, since most countries
refuse for reasons of national sovereignty to enter into such agreements
publicly. In addition, some governments are willing to permit such activities only on a case-by-case basis."'2 6 Arguably, one of the concerns for a
foreign head of state is the possibility of domestic unrest resulting from
such public agreements with the United States. 6 1
Because the House Committee on Foreign Affairs continued to believe
that "the Mansfield Amendment inhibit[ed] the ability of U.S. officials,
particularly DEA agents, to carry out their duties overseas, 2' 6 2 a new
alteration found its way into the House draft of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1986.63 Later subsumed into the omnibus AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986,64 the alteration eliminated the mandate for
any agreement between the Secretary of State and the host state. While
retaining the prohibition against direct arrests by United States personnel," 5 the Act prohibited any officer or employee of the United States
Government from engaging or participating in any direct antinarcotics
police arrest action in a foreign state, unless the United States Secretary
of State determined that such a prohibition "would be harmful to the

258.

Pub. L. No. 99-83, 99 Stat. 190 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22

U.S.C.).
259. Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 605, 99 Stat. 228, 229 (emphasis added).
260. H.R. REP. No. 798, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986) (emphasis added).
261. See supra notes 57-83 and accompanying text.
262. H.R. REP. No. 798, at 10.
263. H.R. 5352, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 203 (1986).
264. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2009, 100 Stat. 3207, 3264 (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. § 2291(c) (1988)).
265. See H.R. REP. No. 798, at 9; Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2009, 100 Stat. 3207,

3264.
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national interests of the United States." 6" Legislative history reveals that
the House Committee on Foreign Relations intended to allow waiver of
the Mansfield Amendment prohibition "where the Secretary of State determines that it would be in the U.S. national interest, and would not be
harmful to U.S. relations with that country."2 6 7 The Committee further
hoped that the United States Secretary of State's authority would "be
delegated to the U.S. Ambassador in each country, who should have con-

trol over activities carried out by U.S. personnel assigned to the U.S.
Embassy."2 6 8 Congress, by enacting this exception to the Mansfield
Amendment further opened the door to irregular rendition, permitting

ad hoc, private agreements on a case-by-case basis between the United
States and host states regarding the apprehension of drug traffickers.

This revision of the Mansfield Amendment may have prompted the
United States Justice Department to issue a legal opinion, advising the

United States Federal Bureau of Investigation that it may legally seize
United States fugitives"

'

in foreign states without the consent of foreign

266. H.R. REP. No. 798, at 9.
267. Id. at 10.
268. Id.
269. The exact meaning of the term "United States fugitives" is not known; the
actual opinion is not public because the Justice Department labeled the opinion "confidential." Chicago Trib., Nov. 9, 1989, at 8. The term might refer only to individuals
who escaped from United States prisons or some other form of custody, rather than individuals who were at large and are initially obtained by extralegal apprehension. This
distinction was made by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. 528, 531 (N.D. Fla. 1988). In
this case, Matta-who escaped from a federal prison camp at Eglin Air Force Base in
1971-was called a fugitive from justice and a fugitive escapee. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois also adopted this interpretation of a
United States fugitive. Matta-Ballesteros ex. rel Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1036,
1047 (S.D. Ill. 1988).
Some evidence suggests that the Justice Department intends a broader meaning of the
term. At later congressional hearings, Assistant Attorney General William P. Barr asserted, as partial justification of a broad construction, "We are facing an increasing menace in the area of terrorism and narco-terrorism .... There are still lawless countries in
the world that sponsor terrorism directed at the United States." Ostrow, Rulings on FBI
Seizures Defended in Congress, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at A18, col. 1 [hereinafter
Ostrow, Rulings]. Further, a government source of the Los Angeles Times claimed that
beginning in 1984, the FBI "was given additional extraterritorial investigative jurisdiction over certain violations of federal law, primarily in areas of homicide, hijacking and
hostage-taking affecting American citizens. Currently, a number of individuals facing
charges in U.S. courts remain at large outside this country." Ostrow, Baker Vows Full
Talks before FBI Uses Foreign Arrest Powers, L.A. Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at A16, col. 4
[hereinafter Ostrow, Baker].
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governments, 270 thus enlarging United States law enforcement arrest authority to include abduction as well as irregular rendition.2 7 ' United
States Secretary of State James Baker stated that the opinion, requested
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was "very narrow [and] based on
consideration only of domestic United States law. 2' 7 2 A statement from
the Administration of United States President George Bush also added
that "[a]n interagency process exists to insure that the President takes
into account the full range of foreign policy and international law considerations as well as the domestic law enforcement issues raised by any
specific case. There will be no arrests abroad that have not been considered through that interagency process. "273
This Justice Department opinion, issued on 21 June 1989, reversed a
nine year old policy maintained under the Administration of United
States President Jimmy Carter, and is the farthest reaching pronouncement of the scope of United States civilian law enforcement authority to
foreign states.274 This pronouncement may be short-lived, however, for
six months after the opinion was drafted, the United States Congress
revised the Mansfield Amendment once again in the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989.276
As a matter of statutory construction, the changes to the Mansfield

270, See Ostrow, Baker, supra note 269; Wines, U.S. Cites Rights to Seize Fugitives
Abroad, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at A6, col. 4. Both President Bush and Secretary of
State Baker were unaware of the policy change until it was disclosed by the Los Angeles
Times on October 14, 1989. See Ostrow, Baker, supra note 269; Wines, supra.
271. The New York Times implicitly noted this distinction when it reviewed the apprehensions of both Juan Matta, in which the Honduran Government cooperated, and
Rene Verdugo, which the Mexican Government protested. Wines, supra 270.
272. Id. At later House Judiciary Subcommittee hearings regarding the opinion,
Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.), apparently unfamiliar with the discretionary
language that existed in 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(2) and of the Supreme Court's interpretation of due process through the Ker-Frisbierule, said, "I can think of no law passed by
the Congress or any provision of the Constitution that licenses the United States to be an
international outlaw." Ostrow, Rulings, supra note 269.
273. Wines, supra note 270.
274. See id.; Ostrow, Baker, supra note 269. Some speculate that this opinion was
directly related to efforts to apprehend General Noriega. See, e.g., Wines, supra note
270; Ostrow, Baker, supra note 269; Ostrow, Rulings, supra note 269. The opinion,
however, was requested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a civilian law enforcement agency, and was based on United States law. The Mansfield Amendment, presumably part of the United States law considered, does not cover activities of the United
States military. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(6) (1988).
275. See Pub. L. No. 101-231, 103 Stat. 1954. The bill became law on 13 December
1989.
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Amendment by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986276 left some ambiguity
in the law regarding the scope of authority of United States officials to
participate in extralegal apprehensions. As already noted, section 2009 of
the 1986 Act retained the original prohibition against "directly effect[ing] an arrest in any foreign country as part of any foreign police
abduction with respect to narcotics control efforts. 2 77 Yet, the following
paragraph of section 2009, with its prohibition against "engag[ing] or
participat[ing] in any direct police action in a foreign country with respect to narcotics control efforts, ' 27 8 essentially paraphrases the original
prohibition and then adds the exception at the discretion of the United
79
States Secretary of State.1
After the release of the Justice Department opinion in 1989, the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs noted the ambiguity left by the
1986 Act, observing that "a lack of clarity in the wording of the law led
to considerable confusion among DEA agents overseas as to what actions
were permissible under what circumstances." 28 0 Thus, in the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, Congress struck out subsection
(c)(2) of 22 U.S.C. § 2291, which contained the exception at the discretion of the Secretary of State, and redesignated paragraph (c)(1), which
contained the original prohibition against direct arrests by United States
personnel, as subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2).281
According to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 1989 Act
revised the Mansfield Amendment to reflect
what has long been U.S. policy and is contained in DEA regulations: that
DEA agents (and other U.S. officials) cannot arrest foreign nationals, that
they may be present and assist arrests carried out by their foreign counterparts if the U.S. Ambassador approves, and that they may take action to
2 82
protect life and safety if emergency situations arise.
Although this new law contains significant textual alterations, DEA
agents may still be present at, and assist in, arrests made by foreign law
enforcement officials, if permission is granted by the United States chief
of mission.2 8 Congress therefore continues to leave the door open for

276. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2009, 100 Stat. 3207, 3264.
277. Id. (amending 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(1)).
278. Id. (amending 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(2)).
279. Id.
280. H.R. REP. No. 342, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23.
281. See Pub. L. No. 101-231, § 15, 103 Stat. 1963; see also 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(1)-

(2).
282. H.R. REP. No. 342, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23.
283. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(2).
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irregular rendition of fugitives captured abroad.
V.

CONCLUSION-KER-FRISBIE:

A LOOK FORWARD

An editorial from the Brazilian newspaper 0 Estado de Sao Paulo
recently proclaimed:
The latest developments in the dirty war waged by drug traffickers in
Colombia against the institutions of that country confirm that the audacity
of criminals knows no bounds. It suggests, too, that drug merchants will
not hesitate to extend the range of their victims-up to now limited to
authorities and journalists who dare combat them-in their effort to bring
the Colombian government to its knees and oblige it to stop enforcing the
law.
The drug traffickers' ultimate aim is to neutralize the state-by seizing
power or making government officials their cohorts, as in Panama-to
thwart reaction by the healthy part of society. Following the somber examples set by their likes in Medellin and Cali, who act against a background of omission or impotence on the part of the Colombian government, gangs of murderers in other nations will feel tempted to copy their
methods. That is why it is vital to immediately halt the advance of the
28
cartels. '
Implicit in this editorial is the recognition that unique legal problems
exist for fighting drug trafficking because of the high level of organization of the drug cartels. These drug cartels are more like terrorist organizations than a group of disunified outlaws. They have an identifiable
political aim "to neutralize the state." Yet unlike the Palestinian Liberation Organization-which seeks the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state-or the Irish Republican Army-which seeks the independence of Northern Ireland,2 8 6-the

Medellin cartel has no such polit-

ical agenda; it merely seeks "to thwart reaction by the healthy part of
society" in order to advance its own criminal activity." 8'
To facilitate this goal, drug traffickers attempt to manipulate or intim284. Nunez, Murderous Drug Cartels Endanger the Continent, reprinted in L.A.
Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at B9, col. 1. This excerpt is from an editorial by August Nunez,
managing editor of the Brazilian newspaper 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, in response to the
murder of two staff members of the Colombian newspaper El Espectador and to the
threat by the drug cartel literally to blow up the city of Medellin, Colombia.
285. One commentator noted, "Many terrorists are by their nature ideologically motivated offenders who are willing to give their lives for the causes they serve. Indeed,
many may aspire to martyrdom or hope for well-publicized trials to explain their motivation." Findlay, supra note 97, at 49-50.
286. Nunez, supra note 284.
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idate governments of drug producing states by a combination of bribery,287 kidnapping, 8 ' and murder,28 9 thereby compromising the integrity
and infrastructure of those governments. 290 The drug lords claim their
territories as inviolate, and successfully oppose many efforts to bring
them to justice by traditional means.
Because cartels are highly efficiently organized and manipulate foreign
governments, United States law enforcement agencies must continue the
practice of extralegal apprehension in both of its forms-abduction and
irregular rendition.
Professor Bassiouni states that the United States courts and foreign
courts misapply the doctrine of mala captus bene detentus.291 This
maxim is subordinate to two other principles of Roman law: nunquam
decurritur ad extraordinarium sed ubi deficit ordinarium-neverresort to the extraordinary until the ordinary fails-and ex injuriaius non
oritur-the Roman law counterpart to the contemporary United States
exclusionary rule.292 Bassiouni is not alone in his criticism of the doctrine and its application in United States law. Shearer describes abduction as "a manifestly extra-legal act, and in practice so hazardous and
uncertain, that it is unworthy of serious consideration as an alternative
method to extradition." 293 Bedi states that all methods of extralegal rendition are "primafacie a breach of international law for which the seizing state is liable to the state of refuge.129 4 Indeed, the international legal

287. For instance, on 2 January 1990, the Office of the Attorney General of Colombia announced that it is investigating allegations of illicit enrichment made against General Jos6 Guillermo Medina Sanchez, the former director of the Colombian national
police. Despite a monthly salary of $1700, Medina lives in a house worth half a million
dollars. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at A9, col. 1; see also Noreiga Indictment, supra note
34; Note, supra note 40, at 291 (discussing evidence linking former Bolivian President
General Luis Garcia Mega to millions of dollars in bribes).
288. In January 1990, the son of Germ.n Montoya, the Secretary General of Colombian President Barco, was kidnapped by the Medellin Cartel. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5,
1990, at 9, col. 1.
289. See supra notes 60-66, 72, 80 and accompanying text.
290. One commentator notes, at least in regard to bribery, that the tactics of the drug
cartels "threaten to destroy the moral, ethical, and legal responsibilities that are the foundations of law enforcement." Note, supra note 40, at 291.
291. 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 88, at 213.
292. See id. Professor Bassiouni, a staunch opponent to extralegal apprehension,
finds three distinct violations in resorting to abduction: "a) disruption of world public
order; b) infringement on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another state; and c)
violation of the human rights of the individual unlawfully seized." Id. at 191.
293. I. SHEARER, supra note 87, at 75.
294. S. BEDI, supra note 93, at 21.
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community strongly denounces the Roman maxim and Ker-Frisbie
doctrine." 5
These commentators' powerful arguments against extralegal apprehension, coupled with the continued implementation of such a system by
the United States and other states, illustrate the dichotomy between the
way things should be and the way things are. In its War on Drugs, the
United States deals with states that are either unable or simply unwilling to assist in the apprehension of known drug merchants.
It is entirely possible, therefore, that the United States has reached
Professor Bassiouni's stage of nunquam decurriturad extraordinarium
sed ubi deficit ordinarium;that is, by manipulating the infrastructure of
host governments, the drug traffickers undermine the procedure for
traditional extradition.29 Now, more than ever, is the time for the
extraordinary.
Professors Abramovsky and Eagle see a need in exceptional cases for
both abduction and irregular rendition, and they articulate conditions
when both modes are appropriate.29 7 Governments should resort to abduction only when "the asylum state has systematically aided and abetted the perpetration of offenses or has constituted a sanctuary to alleged
offenders." ' Many drug producing states already discussed fit this
mold. The clearest example is the Panamanian Government under the
29 9
rule of Manuel Noriega.
The practice of irregular rendition "may well be in conformity with
international law [constituting] ad hoc comity agreements between two
nations to effectuate the adjudication of alleged offenders." ' In such an
extreme area as narcotics enforcement, in which the problem is so broad
and corruption reaches the highest levels of government, ad hoc, clandestine arrangements for the apprehension of these drug lords are literally a

295. See, e.g., O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 279 (1960); Sakellar, supra note 112; Note, When Extradition Fails,Is
Abduction the Solution?, 55 A.J.I.L. 127 (1961).
296. See supra notes 61-83 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the
United States-Colombia extradition treaty and the declaration by President Barco of a
state of siege); note 98 (discussing Mexican reluctance to enforce the United States-Mexico extradition treaty).
297. See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 13, at 92.
298. Id.
299. See supra note 98 (discussing Mexican reluctance to enforce the United StatesMexico extradition treaty); see also Note, supra note 40, at 291 (discussing evidence
linking former Bolivian president General Luis Garcia Mega to millions of dollars in
bribe money).
300. Id.
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way of life. Such agreements benefit both states and do not violate the
territorial sovereignty of either."0 1
A close examination of the cases of Rene Verdugo, Manuel Noriega,
and Juan Matta, combined with the continuing interaction between the
United States and Colombia, illustrate that the United States policy of
extralegal apprehension fits within the model outlined by Professors
Abramovsky and Eagle. Both Verdugo and Noriega were abducted from
their states-Mexico and Panama, respectively-at a time when those
states aided and provided sanctuary to drug traffickers.302 Matta was apprehended, however, with the assistance of the Honduran Government, a
state with which the United States has no extradition treaty and whose
constitution forbids extradition of its nationals. 3 ' Last, with the declaration of a state of siege in Colombia by President Barco, the United States
has initiated no extralegal apprehensions; only formal extraditions from
304
that state currently occur.
The Abramovsky and Eagle model provides a workable construct for
evaluating when extralegal apprehensions are appropriate. Certainly the
United States Government must first seek custody of drug traffickers by
the process of formal extradition. 0 5 When that process fails-that is,
when extraordinary situations arise-extralegal apprehension should remain a viable alternative. United States law enforcement agencies should
first attempt irregular rendition by means of private, ad hoc agreements
with drug producing states, and resort to abduction only in cases in
301. Such ad hoc private agreements may protect the political image, or, in some
cases, the very life of a foreign official. Significantly, in 1985, the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs found that most foreign states refused to enter publicly into agreements
permitting irregular rendition. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
Abramovsky and Eagle recognize such ad hoc agreements as technically lawful because
they constitute agreements of comity, and thus protect the sovereignty of each state.
These agreements, however, "often have been perceived as having an aura of illegality
... because irregular renditions fall outside the traditional extradition process."
Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 13, at 92.
302. See supra note 15 (discussing involvement of the Mexican police in the kidnapping of United States Drug Enforcement Agency agents Camarena and Cortez); see also
supra note 98 (discussing continued reluctance by the Mexican Government to honor the
United States-Mexico extradition treaty); note 34 (discussing the charges pending against
Manuel Noriega).
303. See supra notes 21, 35 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
305. The United States Congress recently directed the United States Secretary of
State "to place greater emphasis on updating extradition treaties, and on negotiating
mutual legal assistance treaties, with major illicit drug producing countries and major
drug-transit countries." Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 4605(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4290 (codified
as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988)).
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which the host state provides aid or sanctuary to drug traffickers. United
States law enforcement agents, in affecting an arrest in a foreign state,
must avoid conduct that would shock the conscience of a court and thus
raise a Toscanino objection.
In order for United States law enforcement agents directly to arrest a
drug smuggler in a state that has provided aid or sanctuary, however, the
Mansfield Amendment must be revised again. Such a change in the law
obviously presents certain risks. It would create international friction between the United States and foreign states, with the possibility that foreign states will retaliate by abducting United States citizens.3 06 To lessen
these risks, Professors Abramovsky and Eagle propose the formulation of
specific congressional guidelines that balance the need for extralegal apprehension against the possible negative effects and which involve input
from all three branches of the United States Government.3 7 Such considerations of foreign policy, however, are best left in the hands of the
United States President, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
and the Ambassador to the host state. This insulated structure is necessary, for even as Professors Abramovsky and Eagle concede, "[t]he impetus for the utilization of irregular rendition by the United States and
various asylum states has been its circumvention of formalities, the need
for quick action, and often the need to obscure who actually conducted
the negotiations and formulated the agreement." '
With the recent opinion of the Justice Department, and the use of the
military to apprehend Manuel Noriega, the approach outlined above appears to be the course that the Executive Branch of the United States
government is taking.30 9 Although this policy carries risks, it comes at a
time when the greatest risk is inaction. On balance, extralegal apprehension constitutes a viable and effective means of apprehending drug traf-

306. See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 13, at 93.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. In.the case of Manuel Noriega, Professor Yale Kainsar and Noriega defense
attorney Ray Takiff agree that there is little constitutional room to challenge Noriega's
apprehension under the principle of mala captus bene detentus. See Salholz, No Sympathy for the Devil, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1990, at 19.
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fickers and curtailing the world's epidemic drug problem.310
Andrew B. Campbell*

310. On 28 February 1990, the United States Supreme Court reversed a ruling by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and held that the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property
owned by a nonresident alien located in a foreign state. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 1990
U.S. LEXIS 1175, it 5.
Although Verdugo lost in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
on the matter of proper jurisdiction under Ker-Frisbie, the Ninth Circuit affirmed an order suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a search of Verdugo's home in Mexico the day after his
capture. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court of
Appeals ruled that DEA officials should have secured a search warrant, yet acknowledged that "[i]n
the present case... a warrant issued by an American magistrate would be a dead letter in Mexico."
Verdugo, 856 F.2d at 1229. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit reached a seemingly untenable position:
although constitutional rights of the accused are not compromised by the seizure of the person of the
accused under the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine-an issue not appealed from the district court-due process
prohibits the seizure of evidence abroad without a warrant.
The United States Supreme Court began its opinion by distinguishing the fourth and fifth amendments. Verdugo, 1990 U.S. LEXIS, at 9-10. Treating Verdugo as a fourth amendment case, the
Supreme Court held:
The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to
trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial. The
Fourth Amendment functions differently. It prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures"
whether or not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial, and a violation of the
Amendment is "fully accomplished" at the time of an unreasonable governmental intrusion.
Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted).
The Court further held that the text of the fourth amendment, unlike that of the fifth amendment, extends its guarantees only to "the people," which the Court found to be "a term of art
employed in select parts of the Constitution" and refers to "the People of the United States." Id. at
12. Because Verdugo is not a United States citizen or an illegal alien residing in the United States,
the guarantees of the fourth amendment do not apply to him.
The Supreme Court's decision is particularly important insofar as it relates to the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine. On the one hand, the decision seems to clear up the ambiguity left by the Ninth Circuit.
Now, persons and property may be obtained without observance of formal procedures, such as formal extradition and search warrants. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court described
Verdugo's presence in the United States as "lawful but involuntary," but did not cite either Ker v.
Illinois or Frisbiev. Collins. Id. at 23.
On the other hand, one of the justifications of the Ker-Frisbierule seemed to be that the abduction of the accused did nothing illegally to enhance the Government's case at trial. See supra notes
180, 183 and accompanying text. This justification is undercut by the Supreme Court's Verdugo
decision because the Government may now enhance its case with evidence seized abroad without a
search warrant. As Justice Kennedy argued in his concurring opinion, "[i]f the search had occurred
in a residence within the United States, I have little doubt that the full protections of the Fourth
Amendment would apply." Verdugo, 1990 U.S. LEXIS, at 34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
* The author thanks the following for their assistance in the completion of this Note:
Ms. Meghan Scanlan of United States Senator Albert Gore's office; Mr. Roger W.
Haines, Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego; Ms. Sandi Murphy, of the Vanderbilt Law Review; and Professor Igor Kavass, Vanderbilt Law School. The author also
extends special thanks to Ms. Mary Demopoulos for her continued support, enthusiasm,
and helpful criticism in the completion of this Note.

